University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

1985

The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights
Controversies
Emily M. Calhoun
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law
Commons, First Amendment Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons

Citation Information
Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV.
549 (1985), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1018.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and
Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 Tenn. L.
Rev. 549, 604 (1985)
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Sep 22 18:14:12 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Volume 52

Summer 1985

Number 4

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
DISTRIBUTIONAL VOTING
RIGHTS CONTROVERSIES
EMILY M. CALHOUN*
I.

II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION .......................................

550

CONTEMPORARY EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES .........................

554

THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROOTS OF STRICT SCRUTINY
IN VOTING RIGHTS ANALYSIS ........................

558

PRECONDITIONS TO A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS .

567

A.

V.

Recognition of the Variety of Shared Interests
That Lend Integrity to Political Communities ..
B. Recognition of the Traditionally Limited Role of
Shared Opinion as a Criterionfor Vote
Distributions..............................
A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL
VOTING RIGHTS CONTROVERSIES ......................

Proving that the State has Distributed the Vote
on the Basis of Opinion ......................
B. The State's Asserted Interest in Ensuring that
CertainVoter Groups Have Access to the Political
P rocess ....................................
C. The Advantages of a First Amendment Analysis

567
579
588

A.

VI.

CONCLUSION ....................................

589
595
598
602

* Emily Calhoun is currently an Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado. She received her J.D. from the University of Texas in
1971. Professor Calhoun wishes to thank her colleagues, Marianne Wesson and
Hiroshi Motomura, for their encouragement and suggestions; her dean, Betsy
Levin, for the opportunity to refine her thesis through the Austin W.F. Scott
Lecture; and her research assistant, Britt Clayton, for his steadfast help
throughout the preparation of this Article.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. 52

INTRODUCTION

Judicial decisions which determine the validity of state systems for distribution of the voting franchise contain a constitutional analysis which is quite perplexing. Distributional questions
frequently arise in two contexts. In reapportionment cases, the
distributional issue usually pertains to the relative weight given
ballots cast by individual voters, although it may also derive
from the way in which the boundary of an election district is
drawn. In voter qualification cases, the distributional issue derives from the exclusion of some persons from the franchise.'
The remarkable aspect of constitutional analysis of distributional controversies pertaining to voting rights is the fact that
first amendment principles are not incorporated into or even
mentioned in the analysis. Distributional issues are typically
perceived as equal protection problems or, increasingly, as problems of institutional structure, representational systems, and
group rights.
This Article asks a simple but important question. Why have
courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, failed to
develop a sophisticated first amendment analysis of individual
rights in distributional voting rights controversies? That first
amendment principles are relevant to these controversies is not
3
2
a novel proposition. Alexander Bickel, Alexander Miekeljohn
1. A distinction should be drawn between those distributions which
exclude some persons from voting or consign voters to particular districts, and
those which give different weights to votes cast by different groups of voters.
Compare Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) and Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The former are important
because they determine what groups of persons will vote for a given candidate
or issue. The latter are important because they create categories of preferred
voters.

2.

A.

BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

59-60

(1978) (The right to vote should be "assimilated" with first amendment rights in
order to avoid subjective judicial judgments in voting rights analysis) [hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL].
3. A. MIEKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) [hereinafter cited as A.
MIEKELJOHNJ. Miekeljohn characterizes the "citizen who votes 'Aye' or 'No' on
an issue of public policy" as a person who engages in a form of speech entitled
to first amendment protection. Id. at 40. Miekeljohn's comments are not limited
to votes cast in referendum elections but apply equally to the selection of
candidates for office. Miekeljohn makes an ambitious argument that "[tihe
principle of the freedom of speech ... is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." Id. at 27.
In his view, the first amendment is a derivative of the right to universal
suffrage. See also C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as C. BLACK]. In contrast, this Article assumes
that there is no entitlement to the franchise in state and local elections. It
makes the more limited argument that, once the franchise is extended to
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and others,4 have suggested that it would not be inappropriate
for courts to analyze voting rights controversies using first
amendment principles. Their suggestions have an intuitive appeal.
When a voter casts a ballot in a general election, he or she is
expressing an opinion on the qualifications of a candidate or on
the policies proposed for implementation by government. Qualification as a voter creates the right to express oneself in a unique
and special forum.
Although the Supreme Court has begun to develop a first
amendment analysis for nondistributional voting rights controversies, it has generally ignored the first amendment in distributio'nal controversies. 5 It has preferred to view distributional
controversies as issues of equal protection or, occasionally, as
issues of group rather than individual rights. A number of seminal
Supreme Court decisions in the area of distributional voting
rights have implicated first amendment values, but these values
have been obscured by the use of an equal protection rhetoric.
The Court's persistence in this regard is surprising. The equal
protection analysis to which the Court adheres is concededly
unsatisfactory. It embroils courts and litigants in an irresolvable
debate about whether the right to vote is constitutionally fundamental.6 The equal protection analysis has been further criticized because it is, at heart, meaningless;' it neither satisfactorily
explains the results in voting rights controversies in which it has
been used8 nor serves as an adequate limiting principle for future
controversies.9 The increasing tendency of equal protection analysis to focus on group rights is equally unsatisfactory. 10
individuals, a state cannot differentiate among potential voters because of their
opinions, which might influence the way in which they cast their ballots.
B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND
848-49 (1976); Casper, Apportionment and
the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1-2 ("the
4.

See, e.g., 1 N.

DORSEN,

CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED

P.

BENDER &

STATES,

right to vote is the First Amendment right par excellence") [hereinafter cited
as Casper]; Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Candidates, 83 DICK. L. REV.
387, 402 (1979); Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights ActRecognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615,
1639 n.104 (1983); Note, The Election Ballot as a Forum for the Expression of
Ideas, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 901 (1983).
5. Occasionally, members of the Court have suggested that the vote is
an expression of individual belief. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957,

986 n.8 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (voters assert their views on public
issues by casting their ballots for candidates); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30-31 (1968).
6. See notes 18-44 infra and accompanying text.
7. Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship,90 YALE L. J. 1063 (1981); Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
8. See notes 18-44 & 55-58 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 125-42 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 237-63 infra and accompanying text.
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The Court's reluctance to develop an alternative, first amendment analysis in distributional voting rights controversies may
stem, in part, from an unwillingness to proscribe the use of
shared opinion as an organizational criterion for the political
communities formed by vote distributions. Application of first
amendment principles to distributional controversies would not
permit political communities to be formed on the basis of shared
voter beliefs or opinions. Political interest groups of persons who
share a common ideology could not be the focal point for vote
distribution schemes.
This consequence of a first amendment analysis is potentially
at odds with judicial assumptions about the inherent nature of
political communities." Justice Stevens, who generally appears
to be amenable to greater reliance on the first amendment in
voting rights controversies, 12 has authored several opinions which
are instructive on this point. Justice Stevens' opinions evidence
uneasiness about attempts to eliminate shared values as a proper
organizational basis for political communities. He has argued that
"[i]f the [political] process is to work, it must reflect an awareness
of group interests and it must tolerate some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage particular segments of the voting populace."1 3 He assumes that state regulation of the franchise is often
tied to political viewpoint and legislative predictions of how
certain groups are likely to vote.14 For example, legislative dis11. The Supreme Court has stated, for example, that it should not
undertake "the impossible task of extirpating politics from ...the essentially
political processes of the ...States." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754
(1973).
12. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part). In Clements Justice Stevens was willing to examine whether a statute
restricting access to the ballot promoted one viewpoint at the expense of others.
Id. at 973 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). He decided that it did not, and
therefore rejected the plaintiffs' first amendment argument. Id. at 974-75
(Stevens, J., concurring in part). In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564
(1983), the majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens relied directly on the
first amendment rather than on the equal protection clause to invalidate an
Ohio law regulating third-party candidacies. Id. at 1569 n.7. In other cases, he
has not hesitated to impose a burden of justification on state distributional
schemes which seem to disadvantage economic and political groups as well as
racial groups; this indicates that he perceives the rationale for the Court's
recent voting rights decisions to be something other than an equal protection
prohibition against invidious racial discrimination. See also Karcher v. Daggett,
103 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-70 (1983); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 650-52 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 91 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 650-52.
14. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 87-88 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 851-52 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
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tricting is not always politically neutral.' 5 Additionally, when a
city eschews at-large elections in favor of single-member districts
in order to achieve an approximation of group political strength
at the representative level of government, the city government
may not have made a decision which is neutral in first amendment
terms.'" Furthermore, Justice Stevens has noted that when groups
"identify themselves by a common interest ... , heritage, ... belief
or by their race, that characteristic assumes significance as the
bond that gives the group cohesion and political strength."'7
Acceptance of Justice Stevens' assumptions makes it difficult, if
not impossible, to apply first amendment principles to distributional voting rights controversies. If the integrity of political
communities is tied to beliefs or shared values, first amendment
principles cannot be applied to schemes for distribution of the
franchise without threatening the community's integrity. The
application of first amendment principles to distributional schemes
which define political communities is simply inconsistent with a
fundamental attribute of those communities.
This Article asserts that application of first amendment principles to distributional voting rights controversies is not inappropriate. Unlike many communities which are defined by, and have
cohesion only because of, the shared values or beliefs of individual
community members, the political communities formed as a result
of franchise distributions are historically and constitutionally
unique. They are not mere governmental counterparts to political
interest groups. They are, in an appropriate and important sense,
communities without values.
Courts are accustomed to applying first amendment principles
to nondistributional voting rights controversies to protect the
belief-oriented and associational rights of voters. They are also
familiar with the historical struggle of minority voting groups to
ensure that specific vote distributions provide an effective mechanism for the expression of their shared political beliefs. Therefore, courts initially may be reluctant to accept the proposition
that political communities formed by vote distributions must,
under the first amendment, be neutral with respect to political
beliefs. The proposition is not, however, radical. The argument
is in the best tradition of first amendment analysis in non-voting
rights controversies affecting the structure of political communities. It is consistent with at least one reading of the intellectual
and philosophical underpinnings of the Constitution, and opens
the way to a constitutional analysis-which is potentially clearer
15. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
16. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 43.0 U.S.
144 (1977).
17. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 650 (emphasis added).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

and more productive than the equal protection analysis which
currently dominates legal debate. This Article explores the proposition that political communities formed through the distribution
of voting rights should be protected under the first amendment.
II.

CONTEMPORARY EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES

Any discussion of how first amendment principles might apply
to distributional voting rights controversies must be prefaced by
a brief review of the conventional equal protection analysis of
those controversies. Although much has been written about reapportionment and voter qualification controversies, no satisfactory discussion of either exists because of a single issue which
dominates and confuses the debate. That issue is whether the
right to vote is constitutionally fundamental. According to judicial
precedent and conventional wisdom, that issue must be decided
before a court can proceed with an equal protection analysis.
Except in those cases in which distributional schemes are based
on racial or other constitutionally suspect classifications, the
decision of whether voting rights are fundamental is what determines whether a given distribution will be tested merely for its
rationality, or whether it will be subjected to a stricter scrutiny.18
Unambiguous guidelines for deciding whether voting is a
fundamental right are not to be found in the text of the Constitution, the governmental structures envisioned by it, or the
discernible intent of its Framers. On the basis of the same
constitutional text and related historical materials, scholars have
argued both for and against the proposition that the vote is a
fundamental right under the Constitution. 9 Frequently, their
arguments are augmented by appeal to political tradition or
cultural expectation. Michael Perry, for example, posits that it is
"wholly unnecessary for the Court to declare that there is a

18. Rationality and strict scrutiny are, of course, two levels of judicial
scrutiny conventionally applied in equal protection analysis. Strict scrutiny is
applied in equal protection cases if a classification either burdens a fundamental
right or is suspect. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962-63 (1982). See Karst,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1977) (application of this principle
to voting rights cases) [hereinafter cited as Karst].
19. See, e.g., J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 118 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as J.H. ELY]; A. MIEKELJOHN, supra note 3, at 96-97 (1960); Karst, supra
note 18, at 27-29; Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1079, 1081-83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Perry]; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1071 (1980).
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constitutional right to vote in state elections, because the existence of the franchise as a political-moral right is unquestioned
.... [That right is] constitutive of American government and
politics, ... every state recognizes [it] and ...no state would

think to deny

0

[it]."2

The Supreme Court itself vacillates. It cannot decide how to
characterize the right to vote in equal protection analysis. In the
same judicial breath, the Court describes the vote as a fundamental right preservative of all rights 21 and a "privilege merely
conceded by society according to its will." 22 On one hand, the
Court pronounces the vote to be the "guardian of all other
rights," 23 "the foundation of our representative society,"' 24 "fundamental,"' 25 and "a bedrock of our political system;" 26 it declares
that "the constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process are no longer doubted. '27 On the other
hand, it asserts that the right to vote is not constitutionally
guaranteed as a fundamental right 28 and refuses, over the objections of dissenting justices, 29 to apply strict scrutiny to all distributions of the vote. The Court's message is unclear, for the
"technically correct" statement that the right to vote has never
been recognized as a fundamental right appears to be at odds
significance and implications of the Court's
with the "symbolic
' '30
jurisprudence.
Individual members of the Court have on rare occasions
directly confronted the basic inconsistency of the application of a
rigorous scrutiny to voting rights controversies and simultaneous
refusal to designate the vote a fundamental right. For example,
Justice Stewart considered strict scrutiny to be inappropriate in
the absence of a judicial declaration that voting is a constitutionally fundamental right.3 1 More recently, Justices Brennan and
20. Perry, supra note 19, at 1079.
21. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
22. Id.
23. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982).
24. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
25. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elect., 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
27. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74
(1973).
28. Id. at 35 n.78. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901).
29. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 374 (1981) (White, J., joined by
Brennan, J., Marshall, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Casper, supra note 4, at 3 n.8.
31. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 639-40 (1969)
(Stewart, J., joined by Black, J., & Harlan, J., dissenting).

556
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Blackmun have acknowledged the issue. They argue that despite
the Court's refusal to characterize the vote as a fundamental
right, a heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in voting
rights cases either because the franchise is "the guardian of all
other rights ' 32 or because classifications pertaining to the vote
pose a special risk of "allocating rights in a fashion inherently
33
contrary to any notion of 'equality'.
A majority of the Court occasionally attempts to justify strict
scrutiny by finessing the question of the constitutional importance
of the right to vote. A common argument is that strict scrutiny
is appropriate when state political processes are not functioning
properly.3 4 In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,35 for
example, the Court asserted that judicial deference to state
legislative classifications is ordinarily appropriate because the
Court assumes that state political institutions and processes are
responsive to the wishes of the people of the state.3 6 A constitutional challenge to legislative classifications for vote distribution,
however, is a challenge to the institutions and processes themselves, and deference is inappropriate. 37 The Kramer proposition
has merit in some instances, as when the apportionment of a
state legislature is questioned, but it does not justify the use of
strict scrutiny when a properly apportioned and otherwise qualified legislature has distributed the franchise. Nevertheless, the
39
Court has utilized strict scrutiny in the latter situation.
The Kramer proposition not only is flawed in its application.
It has even been rejected by the Court. In Avery v. Midland
County,40 according to Justice White:
The majority of a State-by constitutional provision, by referendum, or through accurately apportioned representatives- can
no more place a minority in oversize districts without depriving
that minority of equal protection of the laws than they can
deprive the minority of the ballot altogether, or impose upon
32. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982).
33. Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
34. Compare J.H. ELY, supra note 19, with Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge
of Town: The Contribution of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE
L.J. 1037 (1980) (contrasting views of this argument).
35. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
36. Id. at 627-28.
37. Id.; see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The
proposition in Kramer parallels the argument in footnote 4 to CaroleneProducts.
See 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
38. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 553 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 251 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
40. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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them a tax rate in excess of that to be paid by equally situated
members of the majority. Government- National, State, and
local-must grant to each citizen the equal protection of its laws,
which includes an equal opportunity to influence the election of
lawmakers, no matter how large the majority wishing to deprive
other citizens of equal treatment
or how small the minority who
41
object to their mistreatment.
The Court could not have made this argument without assuming
that the right to vote is in an inherent or absolute sense important enough to be protected by the Constitution. 42 The debate in
voting rights cases thus inevitably becomes a discussion of whether
43
the right to vote is a fundamental right.
41. Id. at 481 n.6; cf. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964) (apportionment plan unconstitutional despite its adoption in a constitutionally valid, popular referendum).
42. See 390 U.S. 474 (1968). The decision in Avery involved a challenge to
an apportionment scheme which was possibly immune from political redress.
Id. at 481. Therefore, the sentiments expressed by the Court may not have had
any direct bearing on the decision in Avery. They are, nonetheless, indicative
of the prevailing judicial attitude.
Justice Powell continues to urge the Court to adopt the position that
choices made by a validly constituted state legislature, even choices affecting
voting rights, must be given deference. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373-74
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring). The majority in Ball did not endorse Justice
Powell's argument as a sufficient ground for its decision. The majority of the
Court would probably agree only with the position taken by Justice Clark in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that this factor may give the Court a reason
to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of the defendants in a voting rights
case. 369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring). But cf. Associated Enters., Inc.
v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 744 (1973) (The Court
relied on the fact that the contested election scheme had been authorized by a
validly constituted legislature to support its decision).
43. Two other arguments should also be mentioned. In Hadley v. Junior
College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court suggested that strict scrutiny is
applied in voting rights cases whenever the state indicates that the decision to
be made in an election is important. Id. at 55. The Hadley argument is
unsatisfactory because it suggests that the Court will interfere with stateprescribed voting schemes only if the Court determines that a state legislature
believes an important decision is to be made. However, if a state legislature
has differentiated among voters, giving some an advantage over others in an
election, the Court should logically conclude that the state believes that the
decision to be made is not universally but only qualifiedly important. The Court
must ignore the state's judgment about the importance of the decision if it
interferes with the election scheme. In Hadley itself the Court did not in fact
adhere to its own admonition that there is judicial deference to state assessments of importance. See 397 U.S. at 53-56 (discussion of impact).
On other occasions, the Court has characterized voting schemes as being
entirely arbitrary. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962). The arbitrariness analysis is also unsatisfactory
as an explanation of most voting rights decisions, however, for a lack of
arbitrariness frequently can be demonstrated. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
at 334-49 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The argument about whether the right to vote is fundamental
and how that issue relates to the form of constitutional analysis
has reached a critical evolutionary stage. In past years, the
debate has shed light on judicial resolution of voting rights
controversies. Additionally, the debate has promoted a careful
review of the constitutional texts pertaining to the franchise and
an extended discussion of the practical significance of the vote
to certain groups. But the argument is no longer helpful. It
results not in intellectual enlightenment, but in obscuring all
other issues and alternative analyses of voting rights controversies.
The first amendment is a useful alternative to current equal
protection analysis of some distributional voting rights controversies. It provides an escape from the irresolvable debate about
the nature of the right to vote. It also offers a much-needed
justification for the use of strict scrutiny in voting rights cases,
for strict scrutiny is warranted by first amendment principles.
Additionally, as the following discussion shows, a first amendment
analysis has other significant advantages over a conventional
equal protection analysis. Most importantly, it does not require
courts to resolve complex44 issues of group voting rights or proportional voting systems.

III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROOTS OF STRICT SCRUTINY
IN VOTING RIGHTS ANALYSIS

Although an equal protection rhetoric dominates voting rights
analysis, earlier Supreme Court voting rights decisions can be
explained by first amendment principles. One of the early voting
rights cases to implicate first amendment principles is Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15. 45 In Kramer the Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of property ownership as a
voter qualification. The plaintiff in Kramer resided within the
boundaries of a New York school district, but the New York
Education Law in effect at that time denied him the right to vote
in school district elections. The law provided thdt eligible resi-

44. There have been other attempts to depart from the mire of equal
protection, fundamental rights debate pertaining to voting rights controversies.
The most notable attempt explains the Supreme Court's voting rights decisions
as preemption cases. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 3; Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 n.119 (1984); Perry, supra
note 19. Although the preemption analysis is useful in understanding some
decisions, see Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965), it cannot explain others, see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
45. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

19851

DISTRIBUTIONAL VOTING RIGHTS

dents of school districts could vote in the school district elections
only if they either owned or leased taxable real property within
the school district, or were parents of children enrolled in the
public schools. The plaintiff was a bachelor living with his parents
and could not satisfy either of these requirements. However, he
argued that as a resident he should have the right to vote in
school district elections.
Much of the Supreme Court's opinion dealt with Mr. Kramer's
challenge to the property ownership requirement. Because the
Court had not clearly designated the vote to be a constitutionally
fundamental right, an observer in 1969 might understandably
have expected the Court to accord the property requirement a
presumption of constitutionality and to uphold it if it were rationally related to a legitimate state objective. Therefore, the
State defended its distribution of the franchise by arguing that
there was a rational relationship between property ownership
and the intelligent use of the ballot. The State asserted that one
who is adequately informed about the issues which are the subject
of an election is able to vote more intelligently, and then argued
that those who own property which may be taxed as a result of
an election are the ones most likely to be informed about the
46
issues.
When Kramer was decided, the Supreme Court had recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in the intelligent
use of the ballot and that an individual's qualifications to vote
have a rational relationship to that interest.47 For example, the
Supreme Court had determined that literacy is a constitutional48
qualification rationally related to the intelligent use of the ballot.

46. Id. at 631.
47. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elect., 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966);
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elect., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1059). Cf. Dusch
v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 116 (1967) (candidate's residency qualification intended
to ensure knowledgeability). Later decisions also recognize the legitimacy of
the interest and its rational relationship to voter qualification. See Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1573-74 (1983); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
354-60 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 242 (Brennan,
J., White, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elect., 360 U.S. 45, 51-52
(1959). However, the Court also has invalidated literacy tests used to discriminate against racial minorities. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145
(1965); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp.
872 (S.D. Ala.), affid per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
The validity of literacy tests usually is not disputed in contemporary
voting rights cases. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding 42 U.S.C. S 1973b (1982)). The qualifications most frequently subject to
constitutional challenge pertain to property ownership or taxpayer status. See,
e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
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Therefore, the state's interest in the intelligent use of the ballot
should have justified dissimilar treatment of individual voters.
The Court did not disagree with the State's assumption that
property ownership would produce knowledgeable voters in school
district elections. Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the property
requirements. The court appeared to agree with plaintiff's argument that property ownership was not the only thing that could
generate sufficient interest in school district elections to promote
an intelligent use of the ballot.5s Plaintiff asserted that he was
both interested in and affected by school district decisions; "[a]ll
members of the community have an interest in the quality and
structure of public education .... "51 In addition, he argued that
the level of property taxation affects all residents of the school
district because "tax levels affect the price of goods and services
in the community. '5 2 Moreover, the Court noted that the statute
permitted some persons to vote despite their relatively remote
and indirect interest in school affairs.5 Given these facts, the
Court was unwilling to uphold the property ownership requirements. According to the Court, the State failed to justify the
property requirement because it had not shown that "those
less interexcluded [from the election] are in fact substantially
5 4
ested or affected than those the statute includes.

The decision in Kramer conventionally has been interpreted
as an equal protection decision. It is fraught with assertions that
the right to vote is at the "foundation of our representative
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Police Jury v. Hebert, 404 U.S. 807
(1971); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969); Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1970), affid,
400 U.S. 884 (1970). Wealth and occupation have also been challenged when
used to restrict the right to vote. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elect., 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 380 (1963). Cf. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (requiring candidates
to pay filing fees as means of selection does not further state's interest in
election integrity).
49. 395 U.S. at 632-33. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elect., 383 U.S. 663,
684-85 (1966) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting) (a discussion of the
rationality of the relationship between property ownership and the intelligent
exercise of the franchise).
50. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15. By statute, the State had provided that even
lessors of taxable real property could vote. Id. at 634 (Appendix to the Opinion).
The Court also noted that the State had recognized that other residents, i.e.,
parents of school children, would have an interest in the election. Id. at 631.
51. Id. at 630.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., id. at 632 (an unemployed, single, childless person who
rented an apartment could vote).
54. Id.
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society, ' 5 and is "preservative of other basic civil and political
rights."56 Debaters frequently return to the opinion whenever the
57
question of whether the right to vote is fundamental arises.
However, if the decision in Kramer is simply an equal protection
opinion it is an extremely confusing one. The rational basis test
usually applied in equal protection cases does not require a state
to formulate precise distinctions between residents with conceivably varying degrees of interest in an election. If the state
rationally believes that property owners, who are directly taxed
by the school district, will be somewhat more interested in the
outcome of an election than others more indirectly affected, the
voter qualification ought to be upheld as long as it burdens no
fundamental right. Given the Court's refusal to declare that
voting rights are fundamental, the invalidation of the property
qualification is perplexing.
A better interpretation of Kramer is as a decision which
protects first amendment rights; it does not rest solely on the
equal protection clause and the presumed fundamental nature of
voting rights. There are two aspects of the Kramer decision
which support this interpretation.
The first ground of support rests on a somewhat technical
point. In Kramer, the Supreme Court cited another of its decisions, Carrington v. Rash,58 to justify its refusal to defer to the
State's rational explanation for the requirement of property ownership for voter qualification. 59 The plaintiff in Carringtonwas a
serviceman stationed in Texas who was refused the right to vote
in Texas elections. 60 The State of Texas had argued that it was
justified in excluding servicemen from the vote to "prevent the
danger of a 'takeover' of the civilian community resulting from
concentrated voting by large numbers of military personnel in
bases placed near Texas towns and cities. ' 61 Texas argued that
a base commander who opposed local police administration or
teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to vote
in conformity with his predilections. Local bond issues might fail,

55. Id. at 626.
56. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
57. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); Millikan v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 n.21 (1974); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 27, 77
(1974) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
59. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) was
also cited as authority for using strict scrutiny in vote dilution cases. Kramer,
395 U.S. at 626. However, Carringtonwas the only voter exclusion case cited.
Id. at 627.
60. 380 U.S. at 89-91.
61. Id. at 93.
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and property taxes stagnate at low levels because military personnel might be unwilling to invest in the future of the area.6 2
The Supreme Court responded that, although Texas had the right
to require all military personnel to be bona fide residents of the
community before giving them tne vote, a state had no legitimate
interest in excluding persons from an election because of their
political opinions or the way in which they might vote. 63 Although
the first amendment was not cited in Carrington, the Supreme
Court was clearly concerned with ensuring that persons with
disfavored political opinions were not put at a disadvantage by
the state. That concern is usually identified as a first amendment
concern.
Second, the arguments in Kramer are consistent with the
inference, drawn from the Court's citation of Carrington, that
first amendment principles were at issue in Kramer. New York
argued that a person with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of
an election would be more likely to make intelligent use of the
ballot. The argument that a voter will not use the ballot intelligently without adequate knowledge of the issues involved may
in reality mask a concern that a voter will not cast the ballot in
conformity with favored political beliefs. In Kramer, quite probably the Supreme Court was concerned with New York's use of
the property requirement to exclude persons with disfavored
political opinions rather than to ensure intelligent voting.
This interpretation of Kramer as a first amendment decision
is supported by Dunn v. Blumstein6 4 a subsequent voting rights
decision. In Dunn the Supreme Court revealed its sensitivity to
the first amendment by explicitly warning that qualifications,
purportedly relevant to ensuring knowledgeable voters, could be
abused if used to ensure that voters possess an acceptable viewpoint. The Court cited Kramer in support of its position.6"
In Dunn the State of Tennessee had attempted to justify a
one-year residency requirement for voters by arguing that the
residency requirement would "afford some surety that the voter
has, in fact, become a member of the community and that as
such, he has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its
government and is, therefore, more likely to exercise his right
[to vote] more intelligently. ' 66 The Supreme Court rejected the
State's argument that it had a legitimate interest in ensuring
62. Id.
63. Carrington,380 U.S. at 94. The Court also rejected the proposition
that occupation was a permissible basis on which to classify members of a
political unit. Id. at 96 (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)).
64. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
65. Id. at 336.
66. Id. at 345.
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that all voters share a common interest with respect to matters
of government.6 7 The Court indicated that too often the lack of a
common interest may mean no more than a different interest,
and differences of opinion cannot be the basis for excluding any
group or person from voting. 68 The Court suggested that the
criterion of "intelligent voting," as defined by the State of Tennessee, was arguably no different from the illegitimate criterion
of "common interest. 6 9 In drawing this comparison, the Court
noted that the criterion of "intelligent" voting is "elusive" and
"subject to abuse. ' 70 The Court cited Kramer for the proposition
that the residency requirement was unconstitutional because
Tennessee did not demonstrate that people who have resided in
the state for less than one year are any less informed than those
whose residence has been of longer duration.71 Significantly, the
citation of Kramer was utilized in conjunction with an argument
that implicated first amendment values.
Despite the fact that Kramer does not contain first amendment rhetoric, a first amendment interpretation of the case is
consistent with the Court's analysis. The Court in Kramer questioned neither the conceptual legitimacy of the state's asserted
interest in knowledgeable voters, nor the assumption that potential voters might be classified into voting and non-voting groups
depending on their varying interests.7 2 However, the Court did
require the state to produce convincing evidence that "those
[potential voters] excluded are in fact substantially less interested
or affected than those the statute includes. '73 By requiring that
evidence, the Court sought assurance that the alleged differences
between the interests of property owners and non-property owners created a genuine basis for classification and did not merely
serve as a proxy for anticipated differences in viewpoint about

67. Id. at 354-56.
68. Id. at 355 (citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969)). In Dunn the Court pointed out
that even the national legislature distrusts the criterion of knowledgeability.
Id. at 357 n.29. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); id. at 242-46 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice Brennan argued that
Congress could reasonably conclude that voting age qualifications are really
unrelated to a legitimate interest in knowledgeability and, in response, could
lower the voting age to 18 in state elections.
69. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355.
70. Id. at 356. The Court then concluded that durational residence requirements cannot be justified on the basis of knowledgeability, but refrained
from ruling on the extent to which a state may bar voting by less knowledgeable
or less intelligent citizens. Id.
71. Id. at 357.
72. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632.
73. Id.
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the way in which the powers of a school district, including the
power to tax real property, ought to be exercised.
Subsequent decisions have interpreted Kramer as a decision
in which the Court applied a conventional form of equal protection
strict scrutiny,7 4 but the "substantially less interested or affected"
test employed in Kramer differs from conventional strict scrutiny.
The Court in Kramer did not require the State to demonstrate
that the method chosen to distribute the franchise was necessary
to further the identified and compelling objective of ensuring
that votes are cast knowledgeably. 5 Rather, the Court required
the State to produce convincing assurances that the property
ownership qualification was a legitimate criterion for distributing
the franchise.76 The Court employed the "substantially less interested or affected" test to guard against the risk that the property
requirement served as a proxy for political opinion.
Two other Supreme Court decisions rendered after Kramer
arguably support this interpretation. The opinions in both Cipriano v. City of Houma,7 7 and Evans v. Cornman,1 discussed
Kramer in conjunction with Carrington. Subsequently, some of
the elements of the Kramer argument lost significance. Although
the Kramer analysis focused on interest, effect, voter knowledgeability, and the state's interest in the intelligent use of the ballot,
in the Court's most recent constitutional decision on voting rights
in a local election, 79 both the Court and the litigants had shortened
the analysis to focus on interest and effect alone. The issue,
distorted by the force of conventional equal protection debate,
had become whether a person's interest in an election, and the
election's anticipated effect upon him, were sufficiently significant
in and of themselves to require the extension of the franchise.'
The Kramer test did not serve as an evidentiary yardstick for
determining whether the franchise had been distributed on the
basis of voter opinion. It was used as a constitutional yardstick
for measuring fairness. That use obscured Kramer's first amendment roots.
Kramer and its progeny are not the only voting rights decisions with first amendment roots. Other cases also implicate first
74. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 533 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., & Brennan, J., dissenting); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726 (1973).
75. Kramer v. Union Free School Unit No. 15, at 621 & 632-33 (1969).
76. Id. at 633.
77. 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
78. 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970).
79. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
80. See text accompanying note 135 infra. The Ball opinion hinted that
the first amendment and Carringtonanalysis might apply in Ball. 451 U.S. at
384 n.8. However, none of the Justices argued that point.
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amendment principles and concerns, although, as with Kramer,
those principles and concerns are obscured by conventional equal
protection rhetoric and interpretation.
One line of cases is characterized by Hunter v. Erickson.8 1 In
Hunter voters in the City of Akron had amended their city
charter so that any ordinance intended to prohibit racial discrimination in housing required referendum approval by a majority
of voters. 2 All other ordinances could be adopted pursuant to
the city's usual, legislative process. 83 The Supreme Court declared
84
the charter amendment unconstitutional in an unusual opinion.
After acknowledging that the charter provision drew "no distinction among racial and religious groups," 15 the Court, nonetheless,
objected that the impact of the amendment fell "on the minority" 86
and placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process. '87 The Court invalidated the charter provision
because of the decisions in earlier racial discrimination and equal
protection cases.88
The charter provision in Hunter may have been disadvantageous to racial groups, but it also made it more difficult for
opponents of racial discrimination in housing to have that point
of view enacted into law. Therefore, the charter embodied a
classification based as much on political philosophy as on race.
Subsequently, in Gordon v. Lance, 9 the Supreme Court itself
construed Hunter as prohibiting a city from fencing out a certain
sector of the population "because of the way they will vote." 90
The Court cited Carrington in support of its interpretation.9 1
Most subsequent applications of the Hunter decision, however,
have stressed only the impact of the challenged political processes
on racial groups, 9 2 obscuring the fact that those processes were
oriented against a particular point of view as well as against a
particular racial group. Notwithstanding these interpretations,
Hunter and its progeny clearly implicate first amendment concerns.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 391-92.
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 5.
Id.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Washington

v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Other voting rights decisions, involving racial bloc voting, also
implicate first amendment principles. In those decisions, primarily
reapportionment cases, the stated issue is usually whether a
particular election scheme discriminates on the basis of race. For
example, the plaintiffs may argue that multimember election
districts are unconstitutional, or unlawful under the Voting Rights
Act, because they reduce the chances that a black voting minority
will be able to elect the representatives they prefer. Both litigants and courts assume that one can predict how a certain group
will vote simply by looking at its racial composition. The plaintiffs'
argument is usually framed in terms of vote dilution. The defendants are accused of racial discrimination against black voters.
However, the defendants could as easily be accused of having
used multimember districting to render ineffective the votes of
a particular group because the group would be likely to vote in
a particular, disfavored way. If one focuses on the fact that such
districting schemes are intended to weaken the voting strength
of politically cohesive groups, instead of on the racially discriminatory impact alone, it is clear that first amendment issues are
implicit in this type of voting rights controversy.
For example, in Beer v. United States,93 the city of New
Orleans sought a declaratory judgment under section five of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that a reapportionment of councilmanic
districts was lawful. 94 The judicial analysis apparently proceeded
on the assumption that elections in New Orleans were characterized by bloc voting along racial lines, 95 thereby enabling one to
predict how a certain group would vote based on its racial
composition. In United Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburg,Inc.
v. Carey,96 the assumption that persons would vote along racial
lines was so important to the analysis that the majority 97 and the
dissent 98 disagreed about whether the assumption was valid. In
neither case, however, did the Court incorporate first amendment
principles into the voting rights analysis, despite the fact that in
both cases the primary importance of the pattern of racial bloc
voting was as an indication of how certain groups would cast
their ballots. The first amendment implications of the cases were
obscured by the language of racial discrimination. Although distributional controversies like those in Beer and United Jewish
93.

425 U.S. 130 (1976).

94. Id. at 133 (citing S 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. S
1973(d) (1982)).
95. Id. at 137; 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); 425 U.S.
130, 159 (1976) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).

96. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
97.

Id. at 166, n.24.

98. Id. at 184-85 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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Organizationsarise because black voters have been discriminated
against on the basis of their race,9 9 they also arise because race
is used to predict how votes will be cast. When a distributional
scheme is based on that prediction, it implicates first amendment
as well as equal protection principles.100
Given the clear presence of first amendment concerns in many
of the Supreme Court's voting rights decisions, it is interesting
that the Court has not suggested a first amendment rationale as
a justification for the use of strict scrutiny in voting rights
analysis. There are, of course, situations in which the Court has
utilized first amendment principles in voting rights controversies.
When candidacy restrictions have an impact on the associational
rights of voters, 0 ' for example, the Court's analysis fits within a
first amendment framework. However, the Court has examined
neither the proposition -implicit in Carrington,Kramer, and other
voting rights decisions-that a vote is an expression of individual
political belief, nor the ramifications of that proposition for state
distributions of the franchise.
IV.

PRECONDITIONS TO A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

A.

Recognition of the Variety of Shared Interests
That Lend Integrity to Political Communities

In the introduction to this Article, it was suggested that the
Supreme Court's failure to develop a first amendment analysis
for distributional voting rights controversies stems from the
perceived irreconcilability of first amendment principles with the
nature of political communities. Although this perceived irreconcilability is the basis of the problem, it is not the only difficulty.
In addition, the Supreme Court must free itself of mistaken
assumptions about the nature of political communities which
renders its analysis prey to a rhetoric that obscures issues.
Although the preceding discussion serves as partial proof of this
point, the extent to which mistaken assumptions and rhetoric
dominate the analysis of distributional controversies is most
99. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
100. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); Port
Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (cases involving
patterns of racial bloc voting).
101. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968). Recently, the Court has declared that a filing deadline for
independent candidates was unconstitutional because of its impact on associational rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983).
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clearly revealed in another line of voting rights decisions. In
these cases, residence played a key role.
Residence within the corporate geographic boundaries of a
government unit is the shared attribute which is most frequently
identified as giving integrity to a political community of voters.
The assumption that residence is uniquely and universally important to the integrity of any political community may stem from
conventions associated with our most familiar political communities. For example, when a person moves into a city he or she
typically qualifies as a voter in a political community consisting
of all residents. As long as the person remains within the corporate geographic boundaries of the community, he or she is qualified to vote. The assumption may also be related to notions of
fairness. The legitimate exercise of governmental power is generally restricted to fixed geographic areas. 10 2 Therefore, as a
matter of fairness, the right to vote on how that governmental
power will be exercised presumably should be distributed to all
persons residing within those fixed geographic boundaries. The
assumption that such distributional schemes are equitable lies at
the heart of the claim that there should be "no taxation without
representation."10' 3
A careless reading of judicial pronouncements may reinforce
the idea that there is a necessary link between residence and
vote distributions that create political communities. For example,
in decisions applying the constraints of the interstate privileges
and immunities clause 10 4 to state action, the Supreme Court has
used the term "citizen"- which may connote a right to voteinterchangeably with the term "resident." 10 5 In the interpretation
of a constitutional provision intended to preserve interstate harmony and the larger community of the United States against
disruptive, parochial interests,10 6 interchangeable use of the two

102. "[TJhe first and foremost restriction imposed by international law
upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contraryit may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State."
Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 18
(Judgment of Sept. 7). See also J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
ch. V, § 45, ch. VIII, §S 120-22 (1690); J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk.
II, ch. 10 (1762); THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 83-84 (J. Madison) (ed. J. Cooke
1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES S 4 (1962).
103. Cf. text accompanying note 137 infra.
104. U.S. CONST., art. IV, S 2.
105. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council
of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (1984) (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420
U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975)). Most laypersons believe that "citizen" means a member
of a political community.
106. Id. at 1026.
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terms may be acceptable; however, the usage might be inappropriate and confusing if employed in a different context. For
example, in its discussions of national citizenship, the Court has
never suggested that residency alone suffices to make an individual a member of the national political community. 17 Residence in
the community may play a role in qualifying an individual for
national citizenship, 10 8 but does not in and of itself give rise to
that status. 10 9
No reason exists why geographic links among individuals must
constitute the shared interest around which a political community
of voters will be organized.110 Distribution of the vote and mem107. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651-54 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
108. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. SS 1401-23, 1427-46 (1982) (acquisition of United
States citizenship by birth or naturalization is dependent upon the physical
presence within the United States or its outlying possessions (during specified
periods of time) of either the petitioner, the petitioner's parents or spouse, or
both); 8 U.S.C. S 1451(d) (1982) (naturalized citizenship of an individual may be
revoked within five years of naturalization if the individual takes up permanent
residence in a foreign country).
109. Moreover, geographic links may relate as much to subordinate political communities as to individuals. For example, the United States is an
association of regional political communities. The Constitution gives representation to states as states in the Senate and in the Electoral College. U.S. CONST.
art. I, S 3; art. II, S 1; & amend. XII. The Constitution may be ratified only
upon the concurrence of three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. In the
not too distant past, the Supreme Court attempted to develop an explicit theory
that states have rights qua states under the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. X; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 103 S. Ct. 1005, reh'g denied 103 S. Ct. 2041
(1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). See
also Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty"
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
110. The relevant political community for the purposes of this Article is
the community whose membership is created through distribution of the right
to vote. Obviously, political communities may be recognized for purposes other
than voting. There may, for example, be an effort to secure the right to share
equally in benefits distributed by the community. See, e.g., the various purposes
recognized in Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913) (protection against
the actions of foreign governments); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856) (right of access to judicial rather than political forums); H. ARENDT, THE
ORIGIN OF TOTALITARIANISM 266-87 (1951); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 43
(1983) (right of place) [hereinafter cited as WALZER]; Bickel, Citizenship in the
American Constitution, 15 ARIZ L. REV. 369 (1973) (a discussion focussing on
benefits); C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 49-66 (access to a judicial forum; protection
against governmental or private interference with the enjoyment of certain
rights). For a general discussion of the nature of political communities, see
Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 8-10
(1970) (a description of various forms of membership); WALZER, supra (discussion
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bership in a community might as easily depend upon personal
allegiance as upon territory."1' The members of Indian Tribes
have an important and shared interest in reservation lands, but
some tribes tie voting rights to ancestry rather than to residence
on the reservation. 12 Shared cultural values may be the primary
membership bond for a community. ' 13 Benefits extended to individuals or obligations imposed on them may collectively constitute
a shared interest giving rise to community membership."' Consent to be bound by group decisions also may suffice as an
organizing principle and a shared interest of a political community.115 In other words, there is no single shared interest which
necessarily defines a political community.11 6 Geographic links
of membership in a political community). Walzer, in turn, compares this type of
membership to membership in clubs, neighborhoods, and families. Id. at 35. By
definition, only neighborhoods extend membership because of geographical
location. Id.
111. J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
3-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. KETTNER]. Kettner distinguishes between
membership based on personal allegiance and membership based on territory
or geographical location. Id.
112. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20-23 (1982). The
power to determine tribal membership is one of the most basic rights reserved
to Indian tribes as sovereign nations. Although specific requirements vary
among tribes, some descent from a tribal member appears to be a universal
requirement for membership. Id. See also Lobsenz, Dependent Indian Communities: A Search for a Twentieth-Century Definition, 24 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 14 n.90
(1982) (examples of tribal membership criteria). This generalization should not
suggest that the jurisdiction defined by the reservation is not of importance.
Subject to certain federal limitations, tribal governments have exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising within the territory of the reservation. See Cohen,
supra, at 236-42. But see Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1856)
(one of the more pernicious discussions of citizenship and ancestry).
113. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 162-67 infra (the discussion of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding public employment of aliens, which stress
this factor).
114. See, e.g., Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L.
REV. 369 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bickel].
115. See Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 324 (1820); A.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
116. See Bickel, supra note 114, at 387 (citizenship is a simple idea for a
simple government).
The fact that one may imagine many different shared interests which could
define a political community does not require one to be indiscriminate in the
choice of what interests will serve as the foundation of a political community.
Different organizing principles have different impacts on society, which may
influence the choice of political structure. See M. GOODALL & J. SULLIVAN,
WATER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL

WATER PLANNING AND POLICY

DESIGN SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA

(1979) (discussion of the relationship between

certain forms of political organizations and indices of the standard of living for
individuals living within the geographic boundaries of the community).
Some political organizations are avoided for historical reasons. In a corpo-
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among individuals, such as residency or land ownership, play an
important but variable and dispensable role as shared interests
which define a political community.
At times, the Supreme Court appears to acknowledge the
principle that membership in a voting community is not necessarily linked to geographic location." 7 On other occasions, the
Court assumes the existence of a necessary relationship between
residence and voting membership in a political community. Three
of the Court's equal protection decisions illustrate the way in
which the mistakenly presumed link between residence and community membership affects and confuses judicial analysis. These
decisions are Ball v. James,118 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
11 9 and Holt Civic
Basin Water0 Storage District,
Club v. City of
12
Tuscaloosa.
In Ball v. James,1 2 1 the plaintiffs lived within the geographic
boundaries of the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement
and Power District in Arizona. They challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provisions under which directors of the
District were elected. The Arizona statute provided that only
owners of land lying within the District were eligible to vote for

rate state, the political community is
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories,
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories
in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders
and articulation of demands and supports.
Schmitter, Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in
Western Europe, 10 COMP. POL. STUD. 7, 9 (1977). Many commentators find
corporatism distasteful because it is linked so closely with fascism, see AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA (J. Malloy ed. 1977), and even
the milder brand of corporatism associated with Western democracies is often
criticized. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.,
410 U.S. 719 (1973) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas expressed outrage that the "corporate voter is put
in the saddle," and deplored the "corporate political kingdom." Id. at 735, 742
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); see also
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978); Gordon v. Lance,
403 U.S. 1, 4 (1971); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (geographic location
bears no necessary relationship to an individual's interest in the subject matter
of an election).
118. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
119. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
120. 439 U.S. 60 (1978). See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474
(1968). The majority assumed the propriety of basing its analysis on a neighborhood model of citizenship. However, in his dissent Justice Fortas questioned
this premise. 390 U.S. 474, 508 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
121. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
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directors. 22 A landowner was not required to be a resident of
the District, but only of the state, in order to vote,1 23 and votes
were weighted according to the amount of acreage owned. 124 Some
plaintiffs owned no land; others owned less than one acre. The
plaintiffs made two arguments. First, they argued that the exclusion of nonlandowners from the election for District directors
violated the Constitution. Additionally, they argued that the
weighting of votes violated the Constitution.
The majority of the Court, utilizing previous reapportionment
decisions, ' 25 resolved the first argument by determining whether
the functions of the Salt River District directors were traditionally governmental and whether they disproportionately affected
different groups of people. 126 The majority concluded that the
District's functions were not traditionally governmental, and that
different groups were disproportionately affected; therefore, it
rejected the excluded plaintiffs' claim. 27
Implicit in the majority's analysis is the assumption that,
under circumstances not present in Ball, residence within the
geographic boundaries of a political community will entitle an
individual to membership in that political community. The dissenting justices in Ball were prepared to require the State to
restructure its political unit to give residents a right to vote. 28'
Therefore, all of the justices concurred in the assumption that
residence plays a special role as one of those shared interests
which determine vote distributions and define membership in a
political community.
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 45-909 (Supp. 1984-85).
123. Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 16-101 (Supp. 1984-85).
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 45-983 (Supp. 1984-85).
125. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In Avery the plaintiffs successfully argued
that malapportioned election districts for a county commissioners' court diluted
the votes of some residents and thereby contravened the one person, one vote
principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). The plaintiffs in Hadley prevailed on a vote dilution
argument comparable to that made in Avery. 397 U.S. at 53-59.
The majority in Ball made only passing reference to the Court's previous
voter qualification cases, and it did so only for the purpose of distinguishing
general from limited governmental functions, 451 U.S. at 366 n.11. See also id.
at 364-65 n.8. The one person, one vote principle of Reynolds seems to have
been the focus of the plaintiffs' arguments as well as the judicial analysis in
the court of appeals. See James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 3.55 (1981). The opinion of the trial court does not reveal the nature of the
arguments considered. James v. Ball, Civ. No. 75-498 (D. Ariz. March 17, 1976).
126. Compare Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1968) with
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) (Different tests were used).
127. Ball, 451 U.S. at 366-71.
128. 451 U.S. 355, 375-77 (1981) (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., Marshall,
J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In previous voting rights decisions, residence was also linked
to vote distribution schemes, but in a critically different way. In
the earlier decisions, the states had made individual residence
within geographic boundaries the primary qualification for participation in a political community and then had attempted to
differentiate among types of residents. The Supreme Court deferred to the states' choice of residence as the shared interest of
importance to the political community, but subjected classifications among residents to equal protection scrutiny.'29 The states'
chosen basis for vote distribution was the predicate for an equal
protection analysis, but the Court did not interpose its own
to the importance of a shared residence to vote
assumptions as
3
distributions.1 0
In an earlier voting rights decision, the Court explicitly acknowledged the importance of this distinction. Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District31 involved a membership controversy affecting a local political unit similar to
Arizona's Salt River District. The Court distinguished between
the membership issue raised by the Salyer plaintiffs and the
equal protection issue in conventional voter qualification cases.
The Court explained that Salyer differed from other voter qualification cases because the State of California had not extended
the franchise to all residents of the water district. 132 Rather,
"[tihe franchise is extended to landowners, whether they reside
in the district or out of it, and indeed whether or not they are
natural persons .... ,,133 The Court noted that, in order to grant
relief to the plaintiffs, it would not simply have to strike down
an exclusion from an otherwise delineated class but would be
required to engraft onto the statutory scheme an entirely new
129. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
629-30 (1969).
130. The equal protection decisions embody a relatively limited constitutional principle. When applied to specific controversies, the principle may have
a significant impact on political institutions, but the impact is secondary. For
example, several states initiated legislative apportionment reforms immediately
following the decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and challenges were
raised in at least 34 states seeking judicial invalidation of existing legislative

districting. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and
Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 645-46, 706-10 (1963). See also Lucas,
Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker
v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711 (1963); Note, State Apportionment-The Wake of
Reynolds v. Sims, 45 B.U.L. REV. 88, 92-107 (1965). The Alabama attempt to
comply with the decision in Baker resulted in further litigation culminating in
the Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
131. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973).
132. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 729-30.
133. Id. at 730.
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class of voters.'34 Based on an assumption about the importance
of a shared residence to membership in the political community,
the plaintiffs had asked the Court to alter a fundamental membership requirement of that community. The Court accepted
neither the argument nor the underlying assumption. The Court's
inexplicable abandonment of this line of reasoning in Ball is
evidence of its confusion about the nature of vote distributions
and political communities.
More important, the plaintiffs in Ball were clearly using
residence as a proxy for impact. They argued that, because of
residence, they suffered impacts which should, as a matter of
fairness, entitle them to vote.' 35 The Court responded, by implication, that in some circumstances an impact argument would be
successful. Thus, the Court implicitly asserted power to require
a state to adhere to or avoid certain types of memberships in
political communities on principles of fairness, a power it has
consistently rejected even when the consequences of a particular
membership controversy have had grave significance for individuals. For example, in the guaranty clause cases the Court has
refused to resolve what are, at heart, membership controversies;
the issue has been held to be non-justiciable.' 36 The Court also
has refused to transmute the Revolutionary slogan "no taxation
without representation" into a constitutional principle., 37 Furthermore, the Court has not utilized the due process clause to
mandate an extension of the franchise to individuals simply
because they are affected by governmental operations in certain
13
ways and principles of fairness argue in favor of extension. 8
134. Id.
135. 451 U.S. at 360.
136. See Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930);
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Bonfield, The Guarantee
Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.
L. REV. 513 (1962); Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV.
681 (1981).
137. E.g., Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1898); Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317,
325 (1820) (Uniformity of taxation rather than voting membership in the community is the individual's safeguard against oppression.). But see Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
138. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70, 75
(1978); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1973).
See also Comment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 157-59 (1977) (a discussion of the
historical refusal of courts to recognize any inherent constitutional right to self
government). But see Durchslag, Salyee, Ball & Holt: Reappraisingthe Right to
Vote in Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 32 n.138 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Durchslag].
There are even cases in which plaintiffs have argued that certain persons
should be excluded from an election because they do not suffer certain impacts.
See Police Jury v. Hebert, 404 U.S. 807 (1971) (property owner argued that only
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Ball was apparently decided as it was both because the
plaintiffs did not make a direct appeal to fairness but rather used
equal protection rhetoric, and also because the Court assumed
that residence was uniquely important to vote distributions.
Direct fairness arguments that distributional rules should be
altered drastically so as to redefine the political community in a
fundamental way have been easy for the Court to reject. The
Constitution makes no clear choices among the types of political
communities which theoretically are available for use by states.'39
It gives the states a certain membership status within the national political community and ties that status to a right to
participate in decisions made at the national level.140 However, it
does not prescribe the qualifications for individual membership
in any given state or national community. Citizenship is mentioned, but is not a status which is clearly associated with the
right to vote.'4 ' As far as local governmental units are concerned,
property owners should be permitted to vote in a Road District bond election);
Cantwell v. Hudnut, 566 F.2d 30, 37-38 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1114 (1979) (plaintiffs argued that, since they were most burdened by the
operation of the unit, they should be the only persons allowed to vote; the
court rejected the argument), Collins v. Brenna, 116 Misc. 2d 985, 456 N.Y.S.2d
931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
139. See Bickel, supra note 114; J. KETTNER, supra note 111, at 231-32.
140. See note 109 supra.
141. See Casper, supra note 4, at 4-5 (a short summary of the constitutional
provisions dealing with the right to vote). There is no constitutional provision
which explicitly guarantees a right to vote. The Constitution defers to state
choice in elector qualifications for the United States Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I,
S 2, cl. 1; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (This section of
the Constitution "gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote
and to have their votes counted.") (emphasis added). The guaranty clause of the
United States Constitution assures every state a republican form of government.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, S 4. It can be assumed that the framers of the Constitution
had in mind a necessary relationship between individuals and the vote. See, e.g.,
J.H. ELY, supra note 19, at 116-25. However, they did not explain what that
relationship should be. The vote is not a privilege accorded citizens of the
United States by the fourteenth amendment. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76-80 (1873). Although the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twentysixth amendments explicitly refer to a right to vote, they only prohibit certain
forms of discrimination once the decision to grant the franchise has been made.
U.S. CONST. amends. 15, 19, & 26. There are plausible arguments that a right
to vote is implicit in the governmental relationships structured by the Constitution. Compare Karst, supra note 18, at 27-29 and Perry, supra note 19, at
1079, 1081-83 with A. MIEKELJOHN, supra note 3, at 96-97 (the right to vote is
an essential aspect of the people's right to govern themselves which is implicit
in the first, tenth and seventeenth amendments and art. I., S 2 of the Constitution). Only one provision of the Constitution may be interpreted as tying
membership in a political community to the right to vote as well as to individual
geographical location. Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment pressures states
to permit all male residents over the age of twenty-one to vote in national
elections. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, S 2.
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the Constitution does not even hint at membership rules. The
decision in Ball, however, indicates that if a distributional controversy is tied to residence and is accompanied by equal protection
rhetoric the Court may recognize neither the implicit appeal to
fairness nor the potential complexity of the issue.142

142. The Court's decision in Ball has generated a considerable amount of
comment, but most of that comment has been misdirected and routine. See
Durchslag, supra note 138; Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict
Between Voting Rights and Property Privileges, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 419; Young,
Supreme Court Report, 67 A.B.A.J. 910 (1981); Comment, From One Person, One
Vote to One Acre, One Vote, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 177 (1981); Comment, State
Water District Voting System Based on One Acre-One Vote Does Not Violate
Equal Protection Clause Despite District'sExtensive Utility Operations,86 DICK.
L. REV. 591 (1982); Note, Ball v. James and the RationalBasis Test: An Exception
to the One Person-One Vote Rule, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 721 (1982); Note, Expanding
the Special District Exception to "One Person, One Vote" Requirement: Ball v.
James, 35 ARK. L. REV. 702 (1982); The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 93, 181-91 (1981); 31 EMORY L.J. 201 (1982).
The commentators describe Ball as a traditional voting rights case in which
the Court resolved an equal protection issue utilizing the rational basis test
instead of strict scrutiny. There is disagreement only as to whether the Court's
use of this rational basis test was justifiable, or deplorable. The commentators,
with a single exception, have not perceived the relationship between the Court's
analysis and its assumptions regarding the nature of political communities. A
test of rationality might be appropriate because, for example, the case did not
implicate an interest in representative democracy. Note, Ball v. James and the
Rational Basis Test: An Exception to the One-Person-One Vote Rule, 31 AM. U.
L. REV. 721, 751 (1982). Strict scrutiny might be necessary because a rationality
test is inconsistent with the allegedly fundamental nature of the right to vote.
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 186 (1981). See Durchslag,
supra note 138, at 30-38.
Durchslag is somewhat of an exception, in that he addresses several critical
points made in this Article. He moves beyond the conventional debate regarding
strict scrutiny and rational basis analysis under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Durchslag, supra note 138, at 5-6. He also recognizes
that the constitutional claim made in Ball implicated membership rules for
political communities. Id. at 30-38. His article is a useful contribution to clarifying the Ball opinion. His conclusions, however, differ substantially from those
set forth in this Article.
The rhetoric in the Ball opinion so successfully cloaks its novel implications
for constitutional analysis of the structure of political communities that courts
misuse the opinion. The courts view the decision in Ball as authority for a
judicial retreat from strict scrutiny and the one person, one vote standard in
all voting rights controversies. See, e.g., Provance v. Shawnee Mission Unified
School Dist., 231 Kan. 636, 648 P.2d 710 (1982); Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306,
437 N.E.2d 1090, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1982); City of Humble v. Metropolitan
Transit. Auth., 636 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982). Even those courts that
distinguish the decision in Ball assume that it represents a retreat from the
stringent scrutiny of the equal protection analysis formerly applied in conventional voting rights cases. See, e.g., Lower Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v.
Public Service Co., 96 N.M. 532, 632 P.2d 1170 (1981); Flynn v. King, 433 A.2d
172 (R.I. 1981).
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In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,4 3 the Supreme Court
attempted to move beyond the rhetoric conventionally associated
with voting rights controversies. Once again, however, false assumptions regarding the relationship between residence and vote
distributions produced a less than satisfactory opinion. In Holt
persons living outside the municipal boundaries of the City of
Tuscaloosa, who were subject to the City's extraterritorial police
jurisdiction, argued that they were denied equal protection of
the laws because they did not have the same voting rights
enjoyed by city residents. In rejecting this argument, the majority distinguished the facts in Holt from those in its other voter
qualification cases by noting that "[t]he line heretofore marked
by this Court's voting qualification decisions coincides with the
geographic boundary of the governmental unit at issue ....144
The majority did not state that residence within corporate geographic boundaries had been identified as the shared interest
which defined and gave integrity to the political communities in
the previous voter qualifications decisions. Additionally, the Court
did not identify residence as the shared interest which had been
chosen to define the political community in Holt. Rather, the
Court generalized about the importance of corporate geographic
boundaries to all political communities, then rejected the plaintiffs' claim because they lived outside the corporate boundaries
of the City of Tuscaloosa. 14 5 No attempt was made to identify the
shared interests which were most important to the community
of individuals given the power to affect, through elections, the
exercise of the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction. Had such an
attempt been made, with full appreciation of the complexity of
the distribution question, the Court might have concluded that
some other shared interest was as important to the integrity of
the community as corporate geographic boundaries. If that shared
interest had been identified as the impact resulting from the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the plaintiffs' claim would
have assumed a different dimension.
The dissenting justices in Holt argued that the shared interest
of the voting community pertained to functional geographic jurisdiction and actual impacts of the unit rather than to artificially
defined corporate boundaries. In their view,
[a]t the heart of our basic conception of a "political community"
. ..is the notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process
of government and those who subject themselves to that process
by choosing to live within the area of its authoritative applica143. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
144. Id. at 70.
145. Id. at 68-70.
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tion .... [The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Tuscaloosa] fracture[s] this relationship by severing the connection
between the process of government and those who are governed

in the places of their residency ....

146

Interestingly, the dissenters also did not attempt to identify the
shared interest that defined the political community in Holt; they
offered only generalizations about the importance of the impact
of governmental authority to the definition of political communities.147 If the dissenters had attempted to identify the shared
interests essential to the integrity of the community in Holt, they
would have been forced to confront the complexities of distribution controversies which arise out of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. They might not have concluded that the shared
interest of importance to the community is any impact resulting
from the exercise of governmental authority, regardless of how
extensive its geographic reach.
The Supreme Court is apparently confused about the relationship of residence to vote distributions and the nature of political
communities.1 48 The Court has shown little appreciation of the
variety of shared interests which the state might recognize as
appropriate links among members of a political community. The
result is a constitutional analysis dictated by labels, rhetoric, 49
146. 439 U.S. 60, 82 (1978) (Brennan. J., joined by White, J., & Marshall,
J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Brennan, J., joined by White, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). Consider
a state legislature that has chosen to form a local governmental unit and to
permit the governor to appoint directors who have authority to levy taxes and
to initiate public projects within the geographic boundaries of the unit. Persons
living outside the geographic boundaries of the unit but within the boundaries
of the state have as much influence over decisions made by unit officials as do
residents of the unit. All state residents would exert equal and indirect influence
through the election of the governor and state legislators. In other words,
membership in that political community which makes decisions having an
immediate impact only on persons living within a limited geographic area is
not tied to residence within that area. There are numerous situations in which
a state chooses to give persons living outside the geographic jurisdiction of a
political unit a voice in how that unit will exercise its jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907). See also Comment, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 174-75 (1977) (the discussion of the power of persons outside
a geographic jurisdiction to appoint officers who would exercise authority only
within that geographic area). The Supreme Court does not appear to appreciate
the importance of the membership issue in controversies involving appointive
office. Cf. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109-11 (1967) (The Court's
repeated refusal to require a state to elect the officers of a local political
community instead of appointing those officers). But see Fortson v. Morris, 385
U.S. 231 (1966).
149. That the Court responds as much to the rhetoric as to the substance
of voting rights controversies is neither novel nor especially surprising. In
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and conventional but false assumptions. Because of this analytic
environment, the Court's failure to utilize first amendment principles to resolve distributional controversies is not surprising. If
the Court does not acknowledge the existence of the variety of
shared interests which may form the basis of political communities, it will not make shared interests the focal point of its
analysis of distributional controversies, and it will not endeavor
to differentiate among those interests or to identify situations in
which shared opinion is the organizing principle for a particular
community.
B. Recognition of the Traditionally Limited Role of Shared
Opinions as a Criterionfor Vote Distributions.
Even if courts come to recognize the variety and significance
of the shared interests which affect vote distributions, there will
be no first amendment analysis of distributions of the franchiseno requirement that the state maintain neutrality with respect
to the opinions of those to whom it extends the vote-until
another important but mistaken assumption is dispelled. That
assumption is that political communities in the United States are
frequently or even necessarily organized with reference to shared
opinions. If this assumption were true, courts could not apply a
first amendment analysis to voting rights controversies without
undermining the essential nature of the nation's political communities. Opinion, however, is neither commonly nor necessarily
the organizing principle of political communities in the United
States.
As the previous discussion of residence demonstrates, political
communities are not necessarily comprised of individuals who
share beliefs or opinions. Consent, geographic location, shared
impact, or shared interests in specific issues may define the
community and give it integrity. These criteria are neutral with
respect to opinion. Although some criteria, such as impacts or
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 296-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan,
J., dissenting), Justice Frankfurter complained that whether the claim is phrased
in terms of due process fairness or equality, an individual's claim to certain
voting rights is a claim to membership in a political community and that mere
constitutional rhetoric ought not to alter the Court's treatment of the claim.
However, as the judiciary and the public accepted the propriety of judicial
intervention in reapportionment controversies, the perceived importance of
Justice Frankfurter's argument diminished. The ramifications of the Court's
continued failure to move beyond rhetoric to confront the complexity of the
distributional issue are not confined to reapportionment cases. Unless the Court
begins to evaluate distributional controversies with reference to shared interests rather than on the basis of equal protection or due process rhetoric, its
voting rights decisions will continue to be confusing and unproductive.
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interests, may occasionally generate or reflect opinion, the criteria are themselves neutral.
As an illustration, the criterion of shared impacts should be
considered. As an organizing principle for a political community
and as a basis for vote distribution, it is facially neutral. The
way in which an individual will vote, is, of course, influenced by
how these shared impacts are felt. There may be a tendency for
similarly affected persons to vote similarly on any given issue.
Such similar voting behavior is most likely when the shared
impacts which determine membership in the political community
are precisely defined. Therefore, an observer may suspect that
the more precisely defined the impact, the more likely it is that
the criterion of shared impact serves as a proxy for the criterion
of shared opinion. The criterion of a shared interest in a particular
issue may also implicate opinion. Such a shared interest may
exist only because individuals experience comparable impacts;
therefore, similar voting behavior may result. Like precisely
defined shared impacts, then, precisely defined shared interests
also may be closely associated with the way in which individuals
will vote and even may serve as a proxy for the criterion of
opinion. In first amendment analysis, the possibility that shared
impacts or interests might be used as a proxy for shared opinion
presents an evidentiary problem for litigants and courts. A shared
impact or interest per se, however, is a neutral organizing prin15 0
ciple.
If the record of judicial decision is any indication, there must
be few instances in which opinion or belief is openly adopted 15by1
a state as a distributional principle for political communities.
150. In some circumstances, it could be argued that a shared interest in
an issue is equivalent to a shared belief in the importance of the issue. For
example, if the vote is given to all persons who have a shared interest in the
development of water resources, the resulting political community arguably
includes only those persons who believe in the importance of water resource
development and excludes those person who believe that water development is
unimportant. If shared interests are defined in this way, opinion is obviously
the organizational criterion for the community. However, the criterion of shared
interests can be interpreted to include all those who believe that water resource
development is unimportant as well as those who believe it to be important.
Therefore, the criterion of shared interests is neutral with respect to opinion.
Cf. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113 (1981) (the distinction between viewpoint and subject-matter orientation) [hereinafter cited as Redish]. A court may have difficulty determining as
a factual matter when shared interests serve as a proxy for shared opinion.
However, conceptually, one need not assume that shared interests always
implicate opinion.
151. But see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (notable exceptions). See
text accompanying notes 169-76 infra.
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Moreover, one might reasonably conclude that opinion, as a
criterion for distributing the vote, is suspect in the context of
the institutional history of the United States. As an historical
matter, proponents of the Constitution attempted to minimize the
influence on the new national government of what they referred
to as factions. 52 Groups of individuals who share a common
viewpoint or opinion are surely factions, as Madison, Hamilton,
and Jay understood them. Gary Wills, a constitutional historian,
has a thoughtful and convincing argument that each of these
individuals, in the spirit of contemporary political philosophy,
aspired to create a representative government in which elections
would select "nonfactious" candidates. 153 They desired candidates
who would "look to the rights of all citizens and the aggregate
interests of the community."' 5 4 Because of the constitutional strategems and structures intended to minimize the influence of
factions within government,' 55 and the distrust of political parties,'M it is difficult to believe that the framers would have viewed
a distribution of votes on the basis of shared opinion with anything but dismay.
Of course, as Wills notes, the aspirations of Hamilton, Jay,
and Madison may "sound like a fairy-tale approach to politics
when we consider what actually happens in the republic ....We
do have candidates now, who openly profess this or that interest;
are expected to do so, and punished if they do not; who belong
to parties, and run as members of them."' 57 Current constitutional
advocacy pertaining to the rights of voters and candidates reflects
this state of affairs.M For example, there are advocates of proportional systems of representation' 59 and defenders of the right
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
153. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981) [hereinafter
cited as G. WILLS].
154. Id. at 224. See also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.15 (1966)
(the state legislature's proffered justifications for multi-member districts). But
see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-60 (1971).
155. G. WILLS, supra note 153, at 193-221.

152.

156. Id. at 210, 213.
157. Id. at 234.
158. See Note, Political Gerrymandering:A Statutory Compactness Standard as an Antidote for Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 398 (1974) (A
notable exception which reaffirms the importance of the Madisonian ideal and
proposes a way of achieving "politically competitive" rather than interest group
oriented districts).
159. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 112 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Plaintiffs advocating proportional systems have likewise been rebuffed by a majority of the Court. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156
n.35 (1971); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964). Cf. Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 105 S.Ct. 416 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring; Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of individuals with shared opinions to join together to spend as
160
much money as they wish on behalf of a given candidate.
In constitutional analysis, however, the Supreme Court has
not significantly yielded to political demand.1 61 A review of a few
examples of different vote distributions or political communities
in which opinion arguably has significance for the Supreme Court's
analysis attests to that fact.
Consider, first, the political community of policy-makers. The
community of policy-makers consists of individuals who make
decisions for the community by formulating policy through positions of public employment rather than through their individual
votes in an election. The community of policy-makers is analogous
to a community of voters, however, because each consists of
individuals entitled to make decisions for the community; exclusion from a community which makes decisions by making policy
is analogous to exclusion from a community which makes decisions by voting.
The most common statutory exclusion from the community of
policy-makers is based on citizenship. 162 In analyzing the constitutionality of these exclusions, some justices speak of the legitimacy of attempts to ensure that policy-making public employees
are closely identified with "the norms of social order,"'1 3 capable
160. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conserv. Pol. Action Comm., 53
U.S.L.W. 4293 (1985).
161. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S 23 (1968).
162. The Supreme Court has upheld the exclusion of aliens from the
community of individuals who formulate public policy because of the asserted
state interest in requiring public employees to commit to both aspects of the
political community's decision-making process. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454
U.S. 432 (1982) (exclusion from employment as a probation officer); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (teacher); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U..S 291 (1978)
(police officer). All exclusions were upheld by the Supreme Court. Cf.Bernal v.
Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984) (interpreting Cabell).
The Court's assumption that acquisition of citizenship automatically entitles
an individual to vote should be noted. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
295 (1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (confusion of national citizenship and the right to vote, two
separate membership questions, and the embodiment of an almost cultural
criterion for certain forms of membership). The Court dismissed, for failure to
present a substantial federal question, an appeal involving an alien's right to
vote, Skafte v. Rorex, 191 Colo. 399, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430
U.S. 961 (1977). Cf. Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1981) (a
community action organization could permissibly exclude aliens from voting for
or sitting on its board of directors). See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1092, 1093-1100 (1977)
(citizenship and aliens generally).
163. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 447.
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and ready to preserve the "values on which our society rests,"'16
familiar with the traditions and institutions of our society, 16 5 or
capable of being integrated into our society. 66 The idea that
exclusion of aliens may be necessary to avoid a dilution of values
important to our society is one theme of the Court's public
employment decisions. 167 Values are beliefs or opinions about
fundamental issues; thus, the Supreme Court hints that the
integrity of a community of political decision-makers is legitimately tied to opinion.
However, a theme differs from a holding. Although the Court
has attached a certain significance to shared values in decisions
pertaining to aliens, it has not held that persons may be excluded
from the political community because they do not believe in those
values. The Court permits states to require individuals to commit
to the state's electoral process of decision-making as a prerequisite to their entitlement to formulate policy for the community;
it does not sanction a requirement that individuals profess belief
in those processes. The principle of the alien-exclusion cases is
analogous to that of the Court's loyalty oath decisions, in which
the Court permits a state to require a public employee to swear
to uphold the Constitution but does not permit the state to
impose an oath which binds an individual to a certain belief." 8
Shared values thus form an important backdrop to the Court's
decisions, but they have not been given judicial sanction as a
criterion for membership in the political community of policymakers.

164. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76.
165. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 660-61.
167. That theme is also discernible in other decisions pertaining to aliens.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler the Court's desire to avoid
diluting important shared values arguably prompted the Court to recognize a
right to public education for alien children. According to the Plyler Court,
education is the means by which individuals "absord the values and skills upon
which our social order rests." Id. at 221. A plausible interpretation of the
controversial Plyler decision is that knowing that Congress has failed to devise
an adequate means of curtailing illegal immigration, the Court feared that
significant numbers of illegal aliens will dilute the shared values of the polity,
and therefore decided to avoid the consequences of the threatened dilution of
values by ensuring that society's primary vehicle for inculcation of those values
is not closed.
168. See, e.g., Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441
(1974) (loyalty oath case invalidating a requirement that political parties sign
an oath that they do not advocate an overthrow of government by force as a
condition to securing a place on the ballot, because the oath required a
commitment to belief); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (a patronage case
prohibiting the firing of public employees because of their beliefs, unless their
beliefs would interfere with the discharge of duties).
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Two other political communities are more troublesome.' 69 They
are formed by vote distributions identical to those with which
this Article is concerned. In analyzing the constitutionality of
these vote distributions, the Court has come close to conceding

169. Another unique community formed with apparent reference to opinion
is represented by national political parties. Although their integrity is frequently assumed to depend on the exclusion of individuals with nonconforming
opinions, the proposition that these parties are organized on the basis of
ideological principle is open to debate. For example, Justice Powell argues that
open primaries can be required of national political parties without jeopardy to
first amendment rights of association precisely because membership in those
parties is not necessarily ideological. National Democ. Party v. Wisconsin, ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 131-32 (1981) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
& Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One can usually become a voting member of a
political party simply by a unilateral declaration of party affiliation. Political
parties tend not to purge or exclude individuals for ideological differences. Cf.
Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-Democratic
National Convention, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1438 (1969); Note, Freedom of Association
and State Regulation of Delegate Selection: Potential for Conflict at the 1984
Democratic National Convention, 36 VAND. L. REV. 105 (1983); Note, "It's My
Party and I'll Cry if I Want To": State Intrusions Upon the Associational
Freedoms of PoliticalParties, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 211 (the history of the National
Democratic Party disputes involving exclusion of delegates). The disaffected
generally voluntarily leave the party.
State laws, see, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974);
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), and party rules, see, e.g., National
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981), intended
to prevent raiding of primaries or other processes of decision-making arguably
suggest that the exclusion of those who disagree with party ideology is important to party integrity, but these laws or party rules may just as rationally be
viewed as requiring a commitment to a process rather than to an ideology. For
example, in Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981), the national party objected to the convention participation
of persons who had not publicly and voluntarily declared themselves to be
affiliated with the party as an organization. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477
(1975), the party objected to convention participation of persons who had been
selected as party representatives through a process which did not comply with
party rules. Neither party rule, both of which were upheld by the Court,
sanctioned the exclusion of a specific individual for differing views.
However, the most important aspect of political parties is that they are
unlike the political communities which function as governmental units. Although
their activities may at times be construed to be state action for purposes of
constitutional analysis, they are fundamentally private organizations. Weisburd,
Candidate-Making and the Constitution: ConstitutionalRestraints on the Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (1984). The first
amendment does not necessarily apply to party decisions to exclude some
persons from membership. Id. Compare the obvious applicability of a first
amendment analysis if a state statute rather than a party rule precludes an
individual from voluntarily associating with the party of his or her choice. See,
e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51 (1973). Because of the unique status of political parties, an ideological
orientation, if it in fact exists, is acceptable for them.
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the legitimacy of distributing the franchise with reference to
shared opinion.
For example, in Gaffney v. Cummings,1"° the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a state legislative apportionment. The
plaintiffs argued that the population disparity among districts
violated one person, one vote strictures."' The defendants responded that the disparities were not so great as to be unconstitutional and that, in any event, they were justified to ensure the
election of district representatives whose party affiliation would
reflect, proportionately, the party affiliations of voters in the
state.' 72 In other words, district lines were drawn in explicit
accordance with the political affiliation of voters. To the extent
that political affiliation as expressed in prior elections reflects a
political viewpoint, the Gaffney districting scheme distributed the
vote on the basis of opinion. In Gaffney, the Court stated that
the political ramifications of districting are inevitable1 73 and oa
pined that judicial power ought to be at "its lowest ebb" when
74
state has attempted to achieve proportional representation.'
75
In United Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey,'
the Court confronted a slightly different vote distribution. New
York had adopted a districting plan with the explicit objective of
ensuring that the political strength of a black racial minority was
not diluted. The plaintiffs, Hasidic Jews, whose previous election
district was split in order to preserve the political strength of
the racial minority, objected that the use of racial criteria in vote
distributions was unconstitutional. The Court, seemingly assuming that the racial minority tended to vote as a bloc,'7 6 held that
the districting plan was not unconstitutional.'7 7 To the extent
that New York devised districts to preserve the political strength
of a group with an assumed shared viewpoint, generally expressed in a bloc vote, the Court apparently approved a vote
distribution based on opinion.
These decisions are troublesome precedents for the first
amendment analysis proposed in this Article. At first glance,
they suggest that states may use opinion as a basis for vote
distributions and that the Supreme Court is willing to condone

170. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
171. Id. at 738-39.
172. Id. at 743.
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 754.
175. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
176. Only Chief Justice Burger objected to this assumption. 430 U.S. 144,
185 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 168; 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J.,
concurring).
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the practice. A closer look, however, reveals that one should not
quickly conclude that a state may freely and constitutionally take
opinion into account in distributing the vote.
Notwithstanding Gaffney and United Jewish Organizations, all
justices of the Supreme Court probably would agree with the
principle that vote distributions resulting in the exclusion of
voters because of their opinions are unconstitutional. The princi1 79
8
1T
ple of non-exclusion arises out of and is generally applied to
situations in which the voting strength of racial groups is adversely affected. However, if one accepts the proposition that the
political strength of those groups is related to their shared beliefs
and bloc voting behavior, this principle of non-exclusion logically
pertains to all groups with shared beliefs.1 80 By definition, voter
property ownership requirements like those considered in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15181 are exclusive, as are
geographical boundaries of political communities like those considered in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 82 Therefore, vote distributions
accomplished through those devices and based on opinion would
probably be viewed with disfavor by the Supreme Court.
Vote distributions which arise out of districting choices, for
example, between single and multimember districts, do not by
definition exclude individuals from voting. They may, however,
have some exclusive effect.18 3 If they do have that effect, the
Supreme Court might also treat those vote distributions, if based
on opinion, as constitutionally suspect under the non-exclusion
principle. 184 In United Jewish Organizations, for example, the
disagreement between Justices White, Stevens, Rehnquist and
Powell on one hand and Justice Burger on the other was a
disagreement about whether New York's districting plan resembled that in Gaffney, in which the Court perceived no exclusion,
or was more like that in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which voters
178. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
179. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); White v. Register, 412
U.S. 755 (1973).
180. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2669 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 652 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
182. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
183. If an individual is placed in a single-member district which is objectionable because organized on racial or party lines, the individual does have a
right to vote. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). An individual placed
in a multi-member district in which racial groups are in the minority also has
a right to vote. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). However, that right
is not necessarily meaningful, depending on the circumstances.
184. But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); White v. Register, 412
U.S. 755 (1973).
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were excluded. s5 Thus, all the justices apparently would adhere
to a principle of non-exclusion.
As to the broader issue of distributing the vote in accordance
with opinion in a non-exclusive way, consider the stances taken
by various groupings of justices in recent cases. All the justices
appear to concede that, in districting decisions, political considerations inevitably come into play. In Gaffney v. Cummings,8 6 this
fact was apparently important to Justices White, Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, who upheld the challenged districting,
scheme.1 87 Of these five justices, all but Justice Blackmun cited

Gaffney with approval in their recent dissent in Karcher v. Daggett.'8 On the other hand, Justice Stevens and Justice Powell
have insisted that a state must remain neutral with respect to
political groups.18 9 Both, however, appear to believe that the

principle of neutrality is not violated if the state relies on racial
criteria in order to enhance the voting strength of minority
groups.' 90 The issues are further confused since Justices Rehnquist and Burger, in one opinion, 9 ' and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist have argued that systems of proportional representation are antithetical to principles of democracy.' 92 Justices Bren-

nan, Marshall and Blackmun have, in recent opinions, avoided the
93
constitutional question.'

The conclusion that the Supreme Court is ready to approve,
as a general proposition, vote distributions which are based on
opinion is unwarranted. Surely, given the opinions expressed in
recent decisions, the converse proposition has equal merit. At
the least, if such vote distributions exclude, they are in all
probability constitutionally suspect. The Court's decisions are

185. Compare 430 U.S. at 165 (plurality opinion of White, J.) with 430 U.S.
at 181-82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The perceived exclusion of a minority group
from the political process was also what was constitutionally objectionable in
Burke County, Georgia's, at-large election system. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982).
186. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
187. See text accompanying notes 170-74 supra.
188. 103 S. Ct. at 2681 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and
Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 2688 (Powell, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2669, 2689.
190. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
165, 167 (1977); 430 U.S. 144, 179-80 (1977) (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J.
concurring).
191. Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 105 S. Ct.
416, 418 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 630 (1982) (Powell, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
193. E.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977).
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not, however, without an ambiguity which necessarily results
from its studious avoidance of a first amendment analysis.
V. A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
DISTRIBUTIONAL VOTING RIGHTS CONTROVERSIES
A limited first amendment analysis for distributional voting
rights controversies is proposed. This analysis requires a court
has
to determine whether the illegitimate criterion of opinion
194
been utilized as the basis for any given vote distribution. If it
has, then first amendment principles would require the state to
justify its use of the criterion by demonstrating a195compelling
interest to which the criterion is necessarily related.
194. The first amendment analysis proposed here is not necessarily applicable to those situations in which a legislature has distributed the vote either
with the subjective intent of excluding or disadvantaging persons with disfavored opinions or in which a facially neutral distributional criterion has an
adverse impact on those persons.
The difficulties associated with an inquiry into subjective legislative motivation have been extensively discussed. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problems of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95 [hereinafter cited as Brest]; Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L. J.
1205 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; Redish, supra note 150. However, the
inquiry appears to have an inevitable and legitimate place in first amendment
analysis. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Cf., United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (motive may be reviewed for purposes of
statutory interpretation); id. at 383 n.30 (the very nature of a constitutional
inquiry may require a review of motive); Ely, supra, at 1275-76 (discussion of
voting rights cases).
An adverse impacts analysis may not be conceptually appropriate for
distributional voting rights controversies. Compare Ely, supra, at 1260, 1329
with Redish, supra. In analyzing some vote distributions, it is clear that an
adverse impacts test of constitutionality would cause difficulties. For example,
groups which are likely to share opinions about certain issues or candidates
may tend to live in the same geographic area. In this situation, a disparate
impacts test would be at odds with the legitimate state objective of establishing
geographically compact districts. In fact, some commentators have argued that
the Supreme Court ought to adopt an objective standard like compactness as
the constitutional standard for voting rights controversies. See, e.g., Edwards,
The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 379 (1971); Note,
Political Gerrymandering:A Statutory Compactness Standard as an Antidote for
Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 398 (1974). In any event, adverse impacts
are not the focus of the first amendment inquiry in this Article. See text
accompanying notes 237-63 infra. If it is established that the criterion for a
given vote distribution is opinion, adverse impacts ought to be irrelevant. But
see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 180 (1971) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan,
J., & Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
195. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118,
2128-29 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); 1 N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
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The proposed first amendment analysis is straightforward. It
may become complex in only two situations. First, if a state has
not openly distributed the franchise on the basis of opinion, but
has instead utilized a facially neutral criterion, a first amendment
analysis will require a plaintiff to show that the neutral criterion
serves as a proxy for opinion. This requirement may present
difficult problems of proof. Second, in some cases a state may
argue that a challenged vote distribution provides effective access
to the state's political processes for particular belief-oriented
groups of voters. In that event, a court will be required to
confront the conceptually troubling question of the constitutional
legitimacy of the state's justification.
A.

Proving that the State has Distributed
the Vote on the Basis of Opinion

As in Gaffney v. Cummings196 or arguably in United Jewish
Organizationsof Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey,197 a state may openly
rely on opinion as the basis for a vote distribution. If reliance on
opinion is unquestionable, a first amendment analysis presents
only the conceptual difficulty discussed below. In other cases,
however, a facially neutral criterion may serve as a proxy for
opinion. In the latter situation, a first amendment analysis is
appropriate only if the plaintiff can prove that the neutral criterion does in fact serve as a proxy for opinion.
When a state is pressed for an explanation of why a particular
shared interest or impact was chosen as the basis for a vote
distribution, the state may find that it can articulate its reasons
only by reference to opinion. For example, in litigation challenging a statute which gave owners of irrigated lands a voting
advantage in the process by which Colorado water conservancy
districts were formed,' 98 the defendants and the State of Colorado
argued that irrigators have a different interest than non-irrigators in the district formation process. 99 Elaborating on the ar43-75 (1976); M.

NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-29 (1984); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-736 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].

196. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
197. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
198. Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata Refer'm v. Animas-La Plata Water
Conserv. Dist., Civ. No. 82-2-448 (D. Colo. March 22, 1982).
199. See Brief of Defendants in Support of Motion to Deny Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and to Grant Summary Judgment in Favor of
Defendants, 12-14, Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata Refer'm v. Animas-La Plata
Water Conserv. Dist., Civ. No. 82-2-448 (D. Colo. August 29, 1982); Brief of the
Attorney General in Response to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 20-21,
Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata Refer'm v. Animas-La Plata Water Conserv.
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gument, the defendants appeared to assert that irrigators were
more likely than non-irrigators to believe in the wisdom of creating water conservancy districts "because water is critical to
the future of agriculture and agriculture is critical to the future
of Colorado."20 0 However, in other instances a state will not
acknowledge that predicted voter opinion regarding the outcome
of an issue was the real criterion which the state used in distributing the franchise. In those instances, circumstantial evidence
showing that the state has distributed the franchise on the basis
of opinion will be important.
Circumstantial evidence that opinion was used as a criterion
for a vote distribution may derive from conduct "viewed in the
context of antecedent and concurrent events and situations." 01'
Inquiry into the statutory and historical foundations of a community may generate inferences about the distributional criteria
utilized by the state. The same is true of state judicial or
legislative characterizations of the community. However, these
characterizations are not dispositive. They may simply be "afterthe-fact rationalization[s] 2 2 "' or pretexts for an illegitimate crite-

rion.203
Other factors which may generate inferences that the illegitimate criterion of opinion has been used are the attitude of the
community 20 4 the processes through which the decision to distribute the vote were made, 20 5 and the effect of the facially neutral
Dist., Civ. No. 82-2-448 (D. Colo. September 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief
of the Attorney General].
200. Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 199, at 21.
201. See generally Brest, supra note 194, at 120-21 (discussing circumstantial evidence as proof of motive).
202. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds the Court
acknowledged that a state has an interest in preserving the integrity of its
subdivisions, and may wish to give a vote to political subdivisions as subdivisions. Id. at 578, 580. However, the Court held that Alabama's reliance on the
federal analogy was an "after-the-fact rationalization." Id. at 573.
203. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). In
Holt the majority chose to emphasize geographic boundaries as the criterion
which gave integrity to the political community, but cautioned that it would
not bind its analysis irrevocably to geographic boundaries. It warned that if "a
city has annexed outlying territory in all but name, and is exercising precisely
the same governmental powers over residents of surrounding unincorporated
territory as it does over those residing within its corporate limits", its analysis
might differ. Id. at 73 n.8 (citing Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253
(8th Cir. 1975)). See also, Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). In Evans the
Court ignored the geographic boundary distinctions between state territory and
federal enclave because the state treated residents of the enclave as state
residents for almost all purposes. Id. at 424-26.
204. See Brest, supra note 194, at 120-21.
205. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2674-75 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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criterion as either arbitrary 2 6 or undesirable with reference to
conventional legislative concerns like cost. 20 7 Any deviation from
established political boundaries in a districting case may suggest
that there was use of an improper criterion. 208 One of the most
telling factors may be the effect of the facially neutral distributional criterion chosen by the state. The adverse, differentiated
impact of a vote distribution on persons holding disfavored political views may have to be substantial or inevitable in order to
give rise to an inference that opinion was the distributional
criterion, 20 9 but impact is a factor which cannot be ignored.
An unconventional interpretation of legislative reapportionment decisions provides an example of how a plaintiff might
construct a convincing argument that a state has distributed the
franchise on the basis of opinion. In most reapportionment controversies, no one disputes that the plaintiffs are legitimate
members of a voting political community-the state. The plaintiffs live within the geographic boundaries of the state and
residency is unquestionably the criterion which determines who
will be given the vote.2 10 The dispute in a reapportionment case
206. See, Ely, supra note 194, at 1230-49 (commenting on the "zigs and
zags" of the boundaries in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)); Redish,
supra note 150, at 145. See also, Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2672-73
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982);
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Cousins v. City
Council, 466 F.2d 830, 859 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 893 (1972).
207. See Brest, supra note 194, at 120-21.
208. See Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
209. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (interpreting
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). The O'Brien Court held that Grosjean and Gomillion stood
for the proposition that the "necessary scope and operation," or inevitable effect
of a statute could give rise to a constitutional violation. 319 U.S. 384-85 (quoting
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 29, 59 (1904). The Court in O'Brien argued
that "inevitable effect" was not an item of circumstantial evidence to be weighed
in considering motive, but, rather, constituted a per se principle for invalidation
of state action. 391 U.S. at 385. Compare Ely, supra note 194, with Brest, supra
note 194 (arguing that Grosjean and Gomillion in fact entail an inquiry into
motive).
210. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963); see also text accompanying notes 129-34 supra. Most of the
Supreme Court's voting rights decisions, including the reapportionment decisions, stand only for the proposition that a state which has chosen to adopt a
particular criterion for membership in a political community cannot discriminate
among members according to the way in which they might vote. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-29 (1969). Accord City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77-78 n.25 (1980); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336-37 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
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is whether the plaintiffs, as legitimate members of the community, have been deprived of an equal vote. The voter does not
allege that residency, impact, interest, or any other criterion
should be used as a basis for distributing the franchise in that
community. The voter simply argues that there should be equality
of influence of individual opinion when ballots are cast.2 1'
Under a first amendment analysis, the judiciary in a reapportionment case must decide whether the vote has been distributed
to individuals within the greater political community on the basis
of opinion. If voting districts have disparate populations and
district boundaries are not based on any readily discernible
shared interest or other criterion perceived to be necessary to
the integrity of the greater political community, then a court may
legitimately surmise that districting was based on the criterion
of opinion in order to disadvantage individual voters with disfavored political opinions. If a state cannot refute the inference
that political beliefs were taken into account, the one person, one
vote standard is a logical remedy. That standard treats the
individual
opinions of all conceded members of the community
21 2
equally.
As an aside, it should be noted that the reapportionment decisions may be
the source of judicial confusion concerning the importance of residency to
membership in political communities. If the Court relies on a constitutional
analysis developed in reapportionment decisions for the analysis of all voting
rights controversies, assumptions about residency which may be warranted in
reapportionment decisions may inadvertently and inappropriately appear in the
analysis of other controversies. For example, the effect of the Supreme Court's
reliance on Avery and Hadley, both reapportionment decisions, in the analysis
in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), a voter qualification case should be
considered. See note 125 supra.
211. Under a first amendment analysis, a vote is an expression of political
opinion. The political opinion of a voter in a district of 10,000 voters has less
weight or influence than the political opinion of a voter in a district of 100. In
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) the Court stated:
If a state should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the
State should be given two times or five times, or 10 times the weight
of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be
contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored
areas had not been effectively diluted .... Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution
and undervaluation of the votes of those living there.... Two, five, or
10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to
that of their favored neighbor.
Id. at 562-63.
212. Compare the Court's analysis of the Ball v. James analogue to the
reapportionment issue. In Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), votes were allocated
and weighted according to acreage. When membership is extended to individuals, the one person, one vote standard cannot be fractionalized. The first
amendment standard requires that individual political beliefs be treated equally.
However, if membership is effectively extended to property, as in Ball, frac-
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An unconventional interpretation of cases involving singleissue referenda illustrates how a circumstantial case may be
refuted. Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action. 13 The plaintiff in Lockport
challenged the constitutionality of a statute which required a
favorable vote of separate majorities of city and non-city voters
to approve a new county charter. An election was held in Niagara
County, New York, in which a majority of non-city voters disapproved and a majority of city voters approved a new charter.
Because of the separate majority requirement, the charter was
not adopted. A group of disappointed voters argued that they
had been denied equal protection because each individual vote
had not been weighted equally in the election. 1 4
In the prototypical reapportionment case, there is no
justification which dispels the inference that a weighted voting scheme
is the result of a vote distribution based on opinion. However, in
Lockport an explanation was offered. The Supreme Court observed that states have "wide discretion ... in forming and
allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions1 21 5 and that
those local government units may have "discrete interests ...
qua units."216 Because a new county charter would frequently
transfer authority from one governmental unit to another, or
even abolish a unit and thereby "effectively shift any pre-existing
balance of power between town and county governments toward
county predominance, ' 217 the Court deferred to the state's decitionalization of votes may be permissible, provided acreage or property does
not serve as a proxy for opinion.
213. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
214. Id. at 262-63. The Court held that equal protection principles utilized
in the one person, one vote decisions were "of limited relevance" to the
controversy. Id. at 266. In a single-issue election,
the expression of voter will is direct, and there is no need to assure
that the voters' views will be adequately represented through their
representatives in the legislature. The policy impact of a referendum
is also different in kind from the impact of choosing representativesinstead of sending legislators off to the state capitol to vote on a
multitude of issues, the referendum puts one discrete issue to the
voters.
Id. Because of this language, courts have assumed that single-issue referenda
should not be governed by the same constitutional principles applicable to
conventional voting rights controversies. The courts have relied on Lockport to
begin developing a unique analytical framework for single-issue referenda. See,
e.g., Provance v. Shawnee Mission Unified School Dist., 231 Kan. 636, 648 P.2d
710 (1982); City of Humble v. Metropolitan Transit. Auth., 636 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982). See also Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd.
of Educ., 32 Cal.3d 779, 654 P.2d 168, 187 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1982).
215. 430 U.S. at 269.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 270.
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sion to give the political units qua units an equal voice in its
adoption. The separate majority election process was
based on the perception that the real and long-term impact of a
restructuring of local government is felt quite differently by the
different county constituent units that in a sense compete to
provide similar governmental services. Voters in these constituent units are directly and differentially affected by the restructuring of county government ....218
In Lockport preservation of the integrity of county government
depended on recognition of the shared interests of constituent
political units and not solely on the shared beliefs of individual
voters. The Court's decision in Hill v. Stone,219 should be contrasted. In Hill the Court invalidated an election process which
was similar to the process that was upheld in Lockport. The
process required the approval of separate majorities of voting
taxpayers and all voters in local bond elections. The decision in
Hill is distinguishable from that in Lockport since, in Hill, the
separate majority requirement was not related to the need to
preserve the integrity of a community of shared interests represented by constituent political units. The Hill separate majority
requirement, having no justification related to a legitimate organizing criterion for political communities, was properly held unconstitutional. The state had offered no explanation for the separate
majority requirement that would dispel a reasonable suspicion
that the franchise had been distributed on the basis of political
opinion.
A court may have difficulty discerning when a state has
utilized an illegitimate criterion for distributing the vote, but the
discovery is not an impossible task. In Dunn v. Blumstein,220 the
state's illegitimate focus on voter preference and a particular
point of view was easily discovered because the state couched its
221
defense of durational residence requirement in suspect terms.
The State had acted in a way that was inconsistent with the
protection of the interest given as the ostensible basis for the
distribution of the franchise.2 22 In Oregon v. Mitchell,223 Justice
Brennan found an illegitimate focus on voter preference because
there were "strong indications that the states themselves do not
credit the factual propositions [of maturity, experience, and cor-

218.

Id. at 271-72.

219.
220.

421 U.S. 289 (1975).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).

221.
222.

Id. at 356 n.28.
Id. at 358-59.

223.

400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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relative intelligent and responsible exercise of the elective franchise] upon which the
restriction [of the vote on the basis of age]
224
-is asserted to rest.
Moreover, under a first amendment analysis, the state may
carry a special burden of proof regarding this issue. The previous
discussion shows how either shared interests or shared impacts
can be used as a proxy for opinion. 225 Therefore, if a state has
distributed the franchise on the basis of the allegedly neutral
criterion of either shared impacts or shared interest in a given
issue, a court should scrutinize the criterion with care because
these neutral criteria can so easily be used as a proxy or pretext
for shared opinion. The Supreme Court engaged in this careful
review in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 to assist
it in the difficult task of differentiating between voter preference
and voter knowledgeability. 226 Thus, under Kramer, a state may
bear a substantial evidentiary burden. Careful scrutiny like that
found in Kramer is premised on the recognition that a state may
legitimately choose from a variety of criteria which may be used
to distribute the franchise. However, the scrutiny takes into
account the ease with which some facially neutral criteria might
227
serve as a proxy or pretext for voter opinion.
B. The State's Asserted Interest in Ensuring that
Certain Voter Groups Have Access to the Political Process
Under a first amendment analysis, a state may argue that
vote distributions based*on opinion are necessitated by a compelling state interest. If a state can persuade the court of the
merits of its argument, then even vote distributions based on
opinion may not be unconstitutional.
States have attempted to justify challenged districting schemes
by arguing that they wanted to ensure that certain interest

224. Id. at 246.
225. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. See also Fullerton Joint
Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 32 Cal.3d 779, 654 P.2d 168, 187
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1982). In Fullerton the court noted the difficulty of distinguishing
between different voter interests, a permissible state objective, and different
voter preferences, an impermissible one. Id. at 805-06, 654 P.2d at 186, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 416.
226. See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
227. In addition, if a plaintiff establishes that opinion was one of several
criteria used to distribute the vote, and the state does not show that it would
have used the same distribution scheme even had it not taken opinion into
account, the state should be required to justify the distribution. Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 n.22 (1982); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977).
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groups were proportionately represented within a given legislative body. For example, in Wells v. Rockefeller 228 and Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler,229 the defendants argued that population variations
among districts resulted from a legitimate attempt to "keep
regions with distinct interests intact ' 230 or to ensure "representation of distinct interest groups.."231 In each of these cases, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument. Population variations
otherwise invalid under the one person, one vote standard could
not be validated through an asserted objective of securing representation of distinct interest groups. However, in Gaffney v.
Cummings, the Court seemed to accept such a justification for
districting decisions which do not result in unconstitutional population variations. 232 When a state offers this justification for a
particular vote distribution, the state introduces into the first
amendment analysis either the propriety of proportional schemes
of representation or an issue like that addressed in affirmative
action controversies. Either question is, at heart, a question of
group rights.
Under the first amendment analysis proposed in this Article,
the question of the propriety of proportional schemes of representation is easily answered. Even when a franchise distribution
based on opinion produces districts of equal population, those
districts are impermissible because they are inherently in conflict
with first amendment principles. The one person, one vote standard is simply one means for ensuring that individuals are not
treated differently in vote distributions on the basis of their
political opinion. Adherence to one person, one vote standards
does not legitimate proportional representation schemes that by
233
definition contravene constitutional standards.
Proportional schemes of representation or other vote distribution schemes which take into account the bloc voting behavior
of racial groups in an attempt to remedy past or continuing
exclusions from the political process cannot be dispensed with so
easily. When a state acts according to principles of affirmative
action in distributing the vote, an additional state interest is
introduced. In such a situation, the state does not distribute the
228. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
229. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
230. Wells, 394 U.S. at 546.
231. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530.
232. See notes 170-74 and accompanying text supra.
•233. Those commentators who have expressed the belief that a state may
adopt a system of proportional representation have not premised those assertions on a careful analysis of first amendment principles. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra
note 195, 759 (1978); Edwards, The Gerrymanderand "One Man, One Vote," 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 379, 397 (1971).
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vote on the basis of opinion solely for opinion's sake but also
because it believes, perhaps, that such a distribution is the only
way of ensuring that individual voters of a particular race will
not be excluded from effective participation in the political process. Typically, courts will be required to reconcile a first amendment proscription on vote distributions made according to
individual opinion with a state's good faith effort to remedy an
arguably unconstitutional exclusion of a racial group from effective participation in the state's political processes.
The task of evaluating state efforts to provide effective political participation for racial groups previously excluded from the
political process is not inevitably or necessarily confounding. It
might be significantly eased were the Supreme Court to take the
position espoused by Justice Powell in affirmative action, equal
protection litigation. Justice Powell argues that the validity of
affirmative action should turn on the nature of the entity which
adopts the standards for affirmative action.2 34 If, for example,
Congress has prescribed standards in response to an identified
problem of racial discrimination, congressional choice may be
accorded deference, and state action taken in accordance with
the congressional mandate would not be unconstitutional. However, entities which neither share Congress' authority to implement the fourteenth amendment nor have a comparable
constitutional authority might be precluded from voluntarily
adopting their own affirmative action remedies.
Through the Voting Rights Act, Congress has set forth standards which govern changes in elections and election procedures
for those areas of the country with a demonstrated history of
racial discrimination. 235 These standards may or may not be
sufficient to accommodate legitimate state attempts to remedy
past voting discrimination. 236 If they are not, perhaps the provi-

234. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 510-11 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
235. 42 U.S.C. S 1971-1974(e) (1982).
236. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1496 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (Pell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Mississippi Republican Executive
Committee, 105 S. Ct. 416 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring; Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan has suggested that questions of group rights in the voting
rights area might properly be addressed under the Voting Rights Act rather
than the Constitution. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144, 171 n.1 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens has
,also suggested that it might be proper for Congress to amend the Voting Rights
Act so as to take care of the problem of racial group participation in the
political process and multi-member districts. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 632
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Justices White, Stevens,
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sions of the Voting Rights Act should be changed, but this Article
is not intended to identify deficiencies in the coverage of the
Voting Rights Act or even to articulate a general theory of
affirmative action for voting rights cases. The important point is
that if states are permitted to take affirmative action to remedy
past racial discrimination in voting only under standards prescribed by Congress, courts will not be required to develop their
own standards. The relative simplicity of the first amendment
analysis concerning individual voting rights will not be placed in
jeopardy, but the state will be accorded appropriate authority to
remedy voting discrimination.
C. The Advantages of a First Amendment Analysis.
Most of the advantages of applying a first amendment analysis
to distributional voting rights controversies should be apparent
from the previous discussion. The first amendment analysis offers
an escape from the irresolvable and seemingly endless debate
over whether the right to vote is fundamental. It is premised on
a principle of political neutrality to which the Court adheres in
other disputes pertaining to the structure of government. It gives
deference to state choice in distributional schemes where deference is appropriate, but it does not permit governmental subterfuge to avoid constitutional constraints on the use of impermissible
criteria. The most important advantages of a first amendment
analysis are apparent, however, only if one compares it to an
alternative equal protection analysis which is being developed in
the context of gerrymandering disputes.
This discussion should begin with a careful review of Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion in Karcher v. Daggett,2 37 in which
Justice Stevens broke, partially, from the analysis conventionally
applied to distributional controversies. Justice Stevens was dissatisfied with the logic that would restrict conventional analysis
to cases involving racial minorities and sought judicially manageable standards for resolving controversies involving racial minorities. 238 His analysis is based on two propositions. Initially, he
and Rehnquist concur in addressing the constitutional issue; the state may
remedy without any necessary reliance on the Voting Rights Act). See Clinton,

Further Explorations in the Political Thicket: The Gerrymanderand the Constitution, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1973) (Congress has the power to adopt
affirmative action standards for excluded voting groups) [hereinafter cited as
Clinton].
237. 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-78 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
238. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3284-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See also Clinton, supra note 236. Clinton also recommends a partial break from
conventional equal analysis and even stresses reliance on Hunter v. Erickson,
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argues that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits political gerrymandering and requires states "to
govern impartially. ' 239 He asserts that election rules "must serve
the interest of the entire community .... If they serve no purpose
other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of
strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community," 40 they are unconstitutional. Second, he states that the interests protected by the
equal protection clause in political gerrymandering cases are
group interests. 24 ' Constitutional standards derived from Reynolds
v. Sims, such as the numerical equality standards applied in
reapportionment cases, protect individual rather than group rights.
242
In fact, those standards may even undermine group interests.
Justice Stevens would evaluate the constitutionality of alleged
political gerrymanders by addressing three questions: (1) whether
the districting plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group; (2) whether the plan has objective indicia
of irregularity; and (3) whether the state is able to produce
convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves neutral,
legitimate interests of the community as a whole. 243 Justice Stevens' test accomplishes some of what a first amendment analysis
would accomplish. Constitutional protection is not limited to those
instances in which political beliefs are shared by racial minorities.
Additionally, constitutional prohibitions are not absolute; a state
may justify a chosen vote distribution by demonstrating the
existence of a legitimate, compelling state interest. Finally, Justice Stevens' equal protection test244eliminates subjective motive
as a critical factor in the analysis.
The first amendment analysis proposed in this Article is
consistent with the foregoing aspects of Justice Stevens' equal
protection test, but it differs in one important respect. Under the
equal protection test, a court must decide whether a vote distribution has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political
group. 245 Under the proposed first amendment analysis, adverse
393 U.S. 385 (1969), and its progeny as a rationale for the new analysis. The
author does not, however, emphasize the first amendment roots of Hunter and
therefore recommends an equal protection analysis which has many of the same
deficiencies as that recommended by Justice Stevens.
239. Karcher, 103 S.Ct. at 2668 (Stevens, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 2669 (Stevens, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 2670 (Stevens, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 2671 (Stevens, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2670 (Stevens, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2671-72 (Stevens, J., concurring).
245. According to Justice Stevens, a plaintiff's primafaciecase of adverse
impact can be made circumstantially. Facts tending to suggest a vote-diluting
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impacts may be important circumstantial evidence of whether
opinion has been utilized as the basis for a vote distribution, but
adverse group impacts are not the focus of the analysis.
A disparate impacts test does not provide judicially manageable standards for the resolution of distributional voting rights
controversies. Justice Stevens proposes to use a disparate impacts test in equal protection analysis to avoid the difficulties
which he perceives to be inherent in any judicial inquiry into
subjective motivation for given vote distributions. However, the
impacts test is as judicially unmanageable as the inquiry into
subjective intent. Under Justice Stevens' analysis, a court must
determine whether a particular vote distribution has a "signifi24 Not
cant adverse impact on an identifiable political group.""
only must a court be able to determine whether an identifiable
political group exists and whether the adverse impact is significant, but it must also prescribe an appropriate remedy for the
group. Each phase of this judicial inquiry leads into an analytical
quagmire.
In the context of districting decisions, Justice Stevens suggests that an identifiable political group would be "one whose
geographical distribution is sufficiently ascertainable that it could
247
have been taken into account in drawing district boundaries.."
Although he states that these groups "will generally be based on
political affiliation, race, ethnic group, national origin, religion, or
economic status, but other characteristics may become politically
significant in a particular context,"' 248 he does not provide any
definitional standards.
He also provides no clear standards for determining when an
impact on a political group is sufficiently adverse to warrant
judicial intervention, although he discusses some of the difficulties
associated with this inquiry. One difficulty "stems from the existence of alternate strategies of vote dilution. 24 9 With respect
to political parties, the showing "may be more difficult ...than
for members of a racial group ...because there are a number of
possible base line measures for a party's strength ...,,250 Furthergerrymander include the excessive fragmentation or concentration of an identifiable group, extreme irregularity or non-compactness of a district, deviation
of district lines from established political boundaries, or a closed or partisan
process for determining where district lines are to be drawn. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell substantially agrees with this use of circumstantial
evidence although he is in search of evidence of a gerrymandering intent. Id.
at 2689-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
246. Karcher, 103 S. Ct. at 2670 (Stevens, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 2672 (Stevens, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 2672 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 2672 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
250. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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more, under an impacts analysis, a state apparently may defend
a vote distribution by showing that a "group's voting strength is
not diluted in the State as a whole. '251 In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg v. Carey, Inc., Justice White suggested
that those Hasidic Jews who complained that New York's districting scheme was unconstitutional had no legitimate grievance if
their interests would be represented by voters in other districts.25 2 The argument is a variant of the "bottom line" defense,
rejected in Title VII litigation, in which the employer argues that
the discriminatory impact of a particular hiring criterion ought
not to be illegal under Title VII as long as the final results of
the entire hiring process show no discriminatory impact. 53 The
majority of the Supreme Court refused to accept this defense in
Title VII litigation because it substitutes group interests for
individual rights.25 4 Justice Brennan has recognized that this shift
in emphasis presents the same barrier to incorporating the ar2 55
gument into voting rights controversies.
Finally, any satisfactory judicial response to a perceived group
discriminatory impact would have to propose an alternate vote
distribution. There are several problems created by this remedial
question. In Rogers v. Lodge, the judicial remedy amounted to a
simple declaration that a multi-member election district would
have to be replaced with single-member districts, 25 6 but the decision was unclear as to why or how the Court decided that those
district lines would protect group interests. Had the Court ordered race to be taken into account to achieve proportional
representation, it might have acted improperly.2 57 As a conceptual
matter, the remedial issue embodies the same difficulty that has
prompted the Supreme Court to adhere to the proposition that
there is no constitutional right to proportionate, i.e. group interest, representation.2 5 8 As a practical matter, judicial remedies like

251. Id. at 2675 n.25 (Stevens, J., concurring). Even if the group's voting
strength has in fact been reduced, the previous plan may have been gerrymandered in its favor.
252. 430 U.S. at 166, n.24.
253. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
254. Id. at 453-54.
255. 430 U.S. at 171, n.1.
256. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1381 (5th Cir. 1981), affid, Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627-28 (1982).
257. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972), on remand, 499 F.2d 893
(5th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978).
258. White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971). Cf., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 630 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(any system of group representation is "antithetical to the principles of our
democracy.")
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that proposed in Rogers may not even have the intended, beneficial effect. As Justice Stevens noted in Rogers, the use of singlemember districts might in some cases
actually operate to the
2 59
detriment of minority racial groups.
The equal protection, disparate impacts test, with its focus
on group interests and rights, is guaranteed to lead courts into
political thickets and "a vast wonderland of judicial review of
political activity. ' 260 The test will undoubtedly provoke the same
criticisms that have been leveled in the past at the reapportionment decisions which were frequently criticized as exceeding the
legitimate scope of judicial review. 261 The reapportionment decisions, however, can be explained in terms of a traditional analysis
that focuses on individual rather than group rights.2 62 By definition, the impacts analysis precludes this explanation. As a result,
the impacts analysis will be open to legitimate objections that it
involves courts in Alexander Bickel's "web of subjectivity. '263 In
contrast, a first amendment analysis would provide a judicially
manageable framework for the resolution of distributional voting
rights controversies, because the focus of the analysis remains
on the individual and on whether opinion was utilized as a
distributional criteria.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts attempt, continually, to resolve distributional voting
rights controversies that clearly implicate first amendment inter259. 458 U.S. at 643-44) 651-52. See also, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52, 59 (1964) (Douglas, J., joined by Goldman, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra
note 195, 758 (It is an oversimplification to speak of a group electing its
representatives. Fencing a group into one district may actually minimize its
influence, especially if there are no "clearly dichotomized" minorities.)
260. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 649. See also, United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171 n.1 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(Justice Brennan refused to address the sticky problem of group rights).
261. See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's protest that the Court chose, in the
reapportionment cases, "among competing bases of representation- ultimately,
really, among competing theories of political philosophy ....
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also A. MILLER, TOWARD
INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

141-43 (1982). Alexander Bickel, for example, viewed the decisions as evidence
of "intellectual incoherence" -as part of a "web of subjectivity," A. BICKEL,
supra note 2, at 45. He believed that they resulted form an unleashed tide of
"populist majoritariansim." Id. at 110. Even those who generally approve of the
results in the reapportionment cases sometimes argue that the decisions implement judicially created principles of fairness rather than constitutional rights.
See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91145 (1982); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic SocietyJudicial Activism or Restraint? 54 CORN. L. REV. 1, 2, 19 (1968).
262. See notes 210-12 supra.
263. See note 261 supra.
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ests through an equal protection analysis. For example, in Bandemer v. Davis,264 in which the Supreme Court has noted probable
jurisdiction, 265 the district court determined that the challenged
apportionment scheme was adopted for explicitly political reasons-to save as many incumbent Republican seats in the state
legislature as possible. Despite the clear indication that voter
opinion was utilized as the criterion for the challenged vote
distribution, the district court embarked on an equal protection
analysis of the sort prescribed by Justice Stevens in Karcher v.
Daggett.26 6 Thus, the district court addressed the question of
group rights and adverse impacts. The dissenting opinion also
applied equal protection, adverse impact principles. 267 The majority found that the districting plan had a disparate impact on a
politically salient group. 268 The dissent argued that no adverse
269
impact had been shown.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will turn to the first amendment
when it reviews the Bandemer decision or, if not then, when an
appropriate case is before the Court. A first amendment analysis
avoids the difficult inquiry into adverse impact and the inevitable
focus on group rights. One cannot guarantee, of course, that a
first amendment analysis will result in the easy resolution of
distributional voting rights controversies. The analysis is worth
exploring, however, if only because it asks new questions in new
terms. It is not constrained by the rhetoric of conventional equal
protection debate. Therefore, it may lead the way to a more
meaningful resolution of distributional voting rights controversies.

264. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
265. 105 S. Ct. 1840 (1985).
266. 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2670-76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
267. 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1500-04 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (Pell, J., concurring in part
& dissenting in part).
268. 603 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
269. 603 F. Supp. at 1504 (Pell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).

